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Asthma is recognized widely as the most common chronic illness of childhood
(Creer & Bender, 1995). According to data presented by the National Center for Health
Statistics (1996), 4.4 million individuals under the age of 18 have asthma. Many
pediatricians, general practitioners, and researchers have traditionally viewed asthma
strictly as an illness of childhood, holding the belief that children outgrow asthma as they
age (Perez-Yarza, 1996). However, increasing numbers of studies have found that
asthma is almost as common in adolescents as it is in young children, and is more
prevalent in adolescence than adulthood (Price, 1996). Specifically, epidemiological
studies have found that asthma symptoms persist in 30-80% of adult patients with
childhood onset asthma (Roordan, 1996). Individuals with childhood onset asthma may
experience a reduction or remission of astluna symptoms during the second decade of
life; however, researchers have increasingly recognized that this pattern does not occur as
frequently as previously thought. Further, some researchers argue that while adolescents
may appear to be symptom free, asthma may remain present in these individuals in the
form of sub-clinical, but significant, airway obstruction and bronchial
hyperresponsiveness (Roordan, 1996).
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Despite the fact that many individuals with childhood onset asthma continue to
experience asthma symptoms during adolescence and young adulthood, these age groups
have largely been ignored by medical and research communities (Perez-Yarza, 1996).
After providing a brief review of the nature of asthma in general, the present paper
reviews literature related to the medical and psychological impact of the persistence of
childhood onset asthma into adolescence and young adulthood. Ultimately, it will be
argued that specific aspects of the experience and treatment of asthma are associated with
a tendency for adolescents and young adults with asthma to be dispositionally self-
focused. Dispositional self-focusing, also known as self-consciousness, refers to an
individual's tendency to direct his attention towards or away from the self. An individual
high in dispositional self-focusing tends to take himself as the focus of his attention more
frequently than an individual who is low in dispositional self-focusing (Carver & Glass,
1976; Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1977, 1982; Smith &
Greenberg, 1981). Notably, measures of dispositional self-focusing have been found to
correlate positively with measures of depression (Smith, Ingram, & Roth, 1985). Further,
research has demonstrated that self-focused attention may intensify the experience of
negative affect and increase the tendency to evaluate oneself negatively, to make internal
attributions for negative outcomes, and to withdraw from a task after an initial failure
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985). Because asthma management necessitates a high
degree of self-focus (e.g., Priel, Heimer, Rabinowitz, & Hendler, 1994), across time
individuals with asthma may become more likely to be high in dispositional self-focusing
than individuals who do not have asthma. Consequently, adolescents and young adults
with asthma who are dispositionally self-focused may experience impaired functioning in
a variety of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral domains, including negative




REVIEW OF THE LITERATORE
The Nature of Asthma
Disease Characteristics
Physical characteristics. Asthma cannot be defined in terms of its etiology, as the
cause of astluna is unknown. Rather, asthma generally is defined in tenns of its hallmark
characteristics, which include intennittency, variability, and reversibility (Creer &
Bender, 1995). Intennittency refers to the notion that the number of attacks individuals
with astluna experience varies from individual to individual, and may also vary within the
individual across time. Individuals with asthma may have a series of attacks within a
short time period, but then may not experience another attack for a significant amount of
time (Creer & Bender, 1993, 1995; Young, 1994). The frequency of attacks an individual
experiences is a function ofnumerous variables, including the number and diversity of
stimuli that trigger an attack, the degree ofhypereactivity of the individual's airways, the
degree ofcontrol established over the disorder, healthcare vari abIes (e.g., access to
astluna specialists), and patient variables (e.g., medication compliance) (Creer & Bender,
1993, 1995).
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Variability refers to the overall severity <of an individual's asthma as well as the
severity of an, individual attack (Creer & Bend~r, 1993, 1995). There is no agreed upon
standard for classifying discrete attacks or an individual's asthma in general as mild,
moderate, or severe (Creer & Bender, 1993). The lack of a standard for classifying the
nature of an individual's asthma makes it difficult to track change~s in the severity of the
disease over time (Creer & Bender, 1995). Although physicians and scientists may not
have an agreed upon standard for classifying the variability of asthma, individuals with
asthma may develop expectations about the severity of their asthma. If the individual has
had mild attacks throughout the coU[se of the disease, he may be unprepared to cope with
a severe attack. An isolated, severe attack may result in psychological and behavioral
reactions that both exacerbate the attack and influence the individual's expectations for
future attacks (Creer & Bender, 1993, 1995). Thus, the variable nature of asthma makes
the disease difficult to predict in both short- and long-tenn time frames.
Reversibility refers to the fact that the acute airway obstruction associated with
asthma can remit either spontaneously or with treatment. Although most patients
demonstrate complete reversibility of airway obstruction following proper treatment, this
is not necessarily the case for all individuals with asthma. The reversible nature of
asthma is what separates it from other respiratory disorders such as emphysema, where
the airway obstruction is permanent (Creer & Bender, 1993, 1995).
Creer and Bender (1995) note that two other characteristics of asthma, airway
hyperresponsiveness and airway inflammation, are of increasing interest to physicians
and behavioral scientists. Airway hyperresponsiveness refers to an exaggerated airway
response to a number of different stimuli. In asthma, this response takes the fonn of a
reduction in small airway diameter due to muscle spasm, mucosal edema or swelling,
mucosal inflammation, or increased mucus secretion. The inflammation of the airways
associated with asthma is believed to be caused by a complex reaction between tissues
and cells present in the airways and inflammatory cells and mediators (Creer.& Bender,
1995; National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, 1997; Sheffer, 1991).
Asthma prevalence, morbidity, and mortality. An estimated 10-15 million
individuals in the United States have asthma (Creer & Bender, 1993) and it is estimated
that 4.8 million of these individuals are under the age of 18 (American Family Physician,
1996). The prevalence of asthma has increased during the previous twenty years in the
United States and other western countries, which, in tum, has been associated with an
increase in morbidity and mortality (Creer & Bender, 1993, 1995). Although the death
rate from asthma appears to be rising faster in young children (5 to 14 years ofage) than
adolescents and young adults (15 to 34 years of age) (Weiss & Wagener, 1990), between
1980 and 1993, the death rate from asthma doubled for individuals between 15 and 24
years of age (American Family Physician, 1996). During this time period, asthma
accounted for 3,850 deaths in individuals under the age of24. Death rates from asthma
during this time period consistently were highest among African-American males
between the ages of 15 and 24 (American Family Physician, 1996).
Mannino and colleagues (Mannino et al., 1998) analyzed more recent data from
the National Center on Health Statistics, finding that between 1993 and 1995, 135
children between the ages of 5 and 14 and 489 individuals between the age of 15 and 34
died from asthma. These incidents yielded death rates of 3.7 and 5.4 per 1,000,000
individuals in the population for the 5 to 14 and 15 to 34 age groups, respectively.
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Consistent with Creer and Bender~s (1993, 1995) statements, Mannino et al. (1'998) note
that these death rates from asthma repre~sent an increase compared to previous decades.
The increasing morbidity and mortality associated with asthma is surprising given that
the medical treatment of asthma has advanced considerably (Creer & Bender, 1993,
1995). Creer and Bender (1993) note that researchers' endeavors to explain this paradox
have failed to yield any acceptable explanations.
In tenns of economic impact, the total estimated cost of asthma in 1990 was 6.2
billion dollars (Weiss, Gergen, & Hodgson, 1992). Direct medical expenditures,
including inpatient hospitalization and prescription medication, account for the largest
proportion of the cost of asthma. Indeed, the estimated number of physicians' office
visits related to asthma care doubled between 1975 and 1995 from 4.6 million to 10.4
million. In 1995, an estimated 1.8 million emergency room visits occurred as a result of
asthma (Mannino et aI., 1998).
Indirect costs of asthma include lost workdays for adults who must stay home
from work in order to care for a child with asthma, as well as lost productivity within the
home when a stay-at-home parent must attend to their child. Between 1983 and 1987,
children between the ages of 5 and 17 missed more than 10 million school days as a
result of asthma. Individuals eighteen years of age and older missed 3 million work days
due to asthma symptoms (Weiss et aI., 1992). A study of college students with asthma
revealed that students missed, on average, 2.8 days ofclass during a semester and were
expected to miss 5.6 days of class throughout the academic year (Jolicoeur, Boyer,
Roeder, & Turner, 1994). Clearly, asthma has an economic impact on individuals and
families who attempt to manage this capricious disease. Unfortunately, given recent data
-
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suggesting that asthma persists into adolescence, many ofthese families will face n
continued economic effects of asthma well beyond childhood.
Nature of asthma in adolescence and adulthood. The progression of childhood
asthma into adolescence and young adulthood is not well understood (von Mutius, 1996).
However, some research suggests that the severity ofasthma in childhood may predict
the persistence of asthma into later life (Roordan, 1996). For example, a prospective
study conducted on 323 British children who wheezed in childhood found that half of the
participants with a minor wheeze in childhood had stopped wheezing by the age of 21. In
contrast, only one-quarter of,participants with frequent wheezing in childhood were no
longer wheezing at age 21. Finally, only 10% ofparticipants with persistent asthma in
childhood did not wheeze at 21 years of age. The authors of the study concluded that
individuals with persistent asthma in childhood are likely to continue to suffer from
asthma in young adulthood, and that the prognosis for young adults who experienced
mild asthma in childhood may not be as favorable as previously thought (Kelly, Hudson,
Phelan, Pain & Olinksy, 1987).
Despite the fact that adolescents and young adults continue to suffer from
childhood onset asthma, medical care for individuals in this age group is frequently
inadequate. Perez-Yarza (1996) notes that adolescents frequently are viewed as "no
man's land" (p. 1) in the medical community because they are viewed as too old to be
seen by a pediatrician and too young to be treated by a general practitioner who
specializes in adult medicine. Consequently, adolescents and young adults with asthma
may not receive sufficient medical care. In a review of the literature, Roordan (1996)
notes that 80% of adolescents with asthma do not receive regular medical supervision of
their asthma despite experiencing nwnerous symptoms. A study of forty-siX adolescents
with asthma in the United Kingdom revealed that only two of the participants were being
treated at a pulmonary or allergy specialty clinic, only twenty-five had undergone peak
flow measurements at any point during their treatment, and most of the participants had
poor knowledge of their asthma and limited understanding of disease management (price,
1996). A study of college students with asthma indicated that 40% of the sample did not
seek medical attention for asthma symptoms despite believing the symptoms were severe
enough to warrant medical care. Another 65% of the sample claimed that seeking
medical care was inconvenient, and 31 % claimed they could not afford medical treatment
(Jolicoeur et aI., 1994). Collectively, these studies demonstrate that adolescents and
young adults with asthma may not be receiving adequate medical treatment necessary to
control their disease.
Given that asthma symptoms persist well beyond childhood, coupled with the data
suggesting that adolescents and young adults with asthma do not receive adequate
medical care, one might expect adolescents and young adults to be the target of
considerable research and intervention efforts. Unfortunately, these age groups have
been largely ignored by the scientific community. Specifically, the majority of research
has been conducted on therapeutic strategies and management ap~roaches for infants,
children, and adults (Perez-Yarza, 1996). Asthma education tends to target families with
asthmatic children or working adults with asthma; however, asthmatics between the ages
of 18 and 25, many of whom are attending college, are rarely included in either of these
targeted groups. Each year, a number of college students with astluna are hospitalized as
-
a result of poor asthma management, but little has been done to examine asthma-related
issues among this age group (Jolicoeur et al., 1994).
In sum, asthma is a chronic illness characterized by its intennittent, variable, and
reversible nature. Despite significant medical advances in the treatment of the disease,
the prevalence of asthma appears to be rising among all age groups, which is associated
with an. increase in the morbidity and mortality of the disease (Creer & Bender, 1993,
i 995). Psychological factors have been included amongst the possible explanations for
the increasing prevalence, morbidity, and mortality of asthma (Bussing, Halfon,
Benjamin, & Wells, 1995). Indeed, research has documented the role psychological
factors appear to play in the onset of asthma, the expression and/or escalation of
symptoms, and the individual's response to treatment (Creer & Bender, 1995).
Psychological Factors Associated with Asthma
The importance of psychological factors in the expression and treatment of
pediatric asthma has been well documented (Creer & Bender, 1995; Silverglade, Tosi,
Wise & D'Costa, 1994). Although a complete review of this literature is beyond the
scope of the present paper, several consistent findings related to psychological factors in
pediatric asthma are noteworthy. McQuaid, Kopel, and Nassau (2001) recently
presented a meta-analysis of twenty-eight samples ofchildren with asthma from twenty-
six studies, representing almost 5,000 children with asthma. The results indicated that
children with asthma evidenced more adjustment difficulties relative to both comparison
groups of healthy children and normative data from standardized psychological distress
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inventories for children. Further, children with asthma demonstrated more internalizing
and externalizing disorders than children without asthma; however, the former difference
was smaller than the latter. The meta-analysis also demonstrated that global adjustment
difficulties, as well as problems with internalizing and externalizing symptoms, increased
as asthma severity increased. More specifically, adjustment problems as well as
internalizing and externa]jzing problems tended to be negligible for children with mild
asthma and became more severe as children moved from moderate to severe asthma. It is
important to note that the majority of the fmdings indicating that children with asthma
evidence more psychological distress than children without asthma hav,e been largely
based on parental report of child behavior (Klinnert, McQuaid, McCormick, Adinoff, &
Bryant,2000). Children's self-report of their anxiety and depression symptoms, as well
as teacher report ofbehavior problems, has failed to yield consistent differences between
children with and without asthma (Klinnert et aI., 2000; McQuaid et aI., 2001). Overall,
however, it appears that children with asthma consistently demonstrate greater levels of
psychological distress than children without asthma based on parental report.
Consistent with the neglect of adolescents and young adults with asthma in the
medical and research communities, much less is known about the psychological
functioning of these two age groups (Chaney, Mullins, Pace, Uretsky, Werden, &
Hartman, 1999; Mullins, Chaney, Pace & Hartman, 1997). The lack of information
regarding the role ofpsychological factors in adolescents with astluna is especially
troubling given that emotional factors may facilitate the exacerbation of asthma attacks in
some patients (e.g., Bussing et aI., 1995). The emotional turbulence usually associated
with adolescence and the adolescent to adult transition, coupled with the potential
-
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emotional adjustment problems associated with asthma and the limited medical treatment
adolescents and young adults with asthma receive, may ultimately yield adverse health
outcomes for these age groups.
Psychological Factors and Asthma Mortality
Strunk (1987) compared two groups of children with equal levels of asthma
severity, with one group having survived their illness while members of the second group
died from asthma-related causes. Strunk (1987) found that ten of the fourteen variables
that distinguished the two groups were related to the psychological adaptation of the child
or the child's family. He further noted that both his results and those of other
investigators found that asthma-related deaths occurred more often in adolescents as
compared to younger children. Although reasons for the increased mortality among
adolescents were unclear, Strunk (1987) suggests that the psychological factors
associated with asthma, combined with the developmental issues of adolescence, may
lead to fatal outcomes. It is also possible that the endocrine changes of adolescence may
produce a physiological explanation for the increase in asthma severity associated with
death in some adolescents (Strunk, 1987). These findings suggest that, for at least some
adolescents, the interaction between asthma severity and certain psychological factors
may be potent enough to lead to death. Clearly, further research on the role of
psychological factors in adolescent and young adult asthma is justified.
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Emotional Adjustment ofAdolescents and Young Adults wi h Asthma
A limited amount of empirical work has begun to illuminate the role of
psychological factors in adolescents and young adults with asthma. Perez-Yarza (1996)
posits that adolescents with chronic illnesses such as asthma may begin to realize that
their illness may limit future professional goals and social development. As a result, the
adolescent may experience feelings of failure and helplessness, impaired self-esteem, and
anger. These feelings, in turn, may be associated with a failure to avoid stimuli likely to
trigger asthma, poor compliance with treatment, and a decline in the monitoring of
asthma symptoms (Perez-Yarza, 1996).
Research has demonstrated that the relationship between emotional adjustment
problems and asthma in adolescence may depend on disease severity (price, 1996). For
example, Silverglade et a1. (1994) found that 128 adolescents with asthma scored higher
on measures of anxiety, depression, and hostility, and measures of irrational beliefs (e.g.,
the need for approval from others and the inability to control emotions) than a control
group of healthy adolescents. However, these results largely depended on the severity of
the asthma. Adolescents with mild asthma were more likely to resemble healthy peers on
outcome measures, whereas adolescents with severe asthma were more likely to have
adjustment difficulties. The researchers also concluded that a subset of adolescents with
asthma appear to display a strong dependency on significant others as well as a sense of
helplessness, anxiety, depression, and hostility (Silverglade et al., 1994). Adolescents
with asthma are at risk of experiencing emotional adjustment problems, and this is
particularly true among adolescents with severe asthma.
-
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Not only has psychological distress been documented in. younger adolescents with
asthma, research has found that older adolescents and young adults with asthma also
experience psychological difficulties. In a study conducted by Mullins and his colleagues
(Mullins et aI., 1997), forty-nine college students with asthma aged 17 to 26 completed
measures of psychological distress, illness uncertainty, and attributional style. The
results indicated that the participants' level ofpsychological distliess fell just beyond one
standard deviation of the instrument's nonnative sample, indirectly suggesting elevated
levels of psychological distress. Interestingly, the study also found that high levels of
illness uncertainty and increased stable attributions for negative events were
independently related to psychological distress.
Illness uncertainty refers to the inability of an individual with a chronic illness to
detennine the meaning of an event related to the illness or to predict outcomes related to
the illness accurately due to a lack of appropriate cues (Mishel, 1990). illness uncertainty
may result from ambiguity about the state of the illness, the complexity of treatment, lack
of infonnation about the seriousness of the illness or prognosis, and the unpredictability
of the illness (Mishel, 1984). Stable attributions for negative events refer to the
individual's tendency to view the cause of an adverse outcome as likely to persist across
time (Alloy, 1982). Thus, Mullins et a1. (1997) found that these two cognitive appraisal
processes independently predicted the level of psychological distress in adolescents and
young adults with asthma.
Mullins et a1. (1997) posited that the intermittent nature of asthma (e.g., the
number of attacks varying across time) may increase the individual's level of illness
uncertainty, especially in the context of asthma management. In other words, because
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the individual may not be able to predict the number ofattacks he or she is likely to
experience in a given time frame, they may feel uncertain about their illness and doubt
their ability to manage the illness effectively. Mullins et al. (1997) argue that, over time,
the individual's feelings of uncertainty may become associated with negative outcomes
(i.e., poor disease control). Further, the researchers posited that, as a result ofrepeated
exposure to the unpredictable nature of asthma, individuals with asthma may tend to have
a cognitive style that includes an expectation ofnegative outcomes for both asthma-
related and non-asthma related events and the expectation that these negative outcomes
cannot be avoided. Thus, the researchers argued that uncertainty about asthma
management and the expectation ofnegative outcomes for events may contribute to the
psychological distress experienced by individuals with asthma.
Such findings are consistent with results obtained from studies of two other
chronic illnesses. First, Kuttner, Delamater, and Santiago (1990) hypothesized that
children with diabetes who repeatedly experience poor metabolic control despite
compliance with their treatment plan may attribute control problems to factors internal to
themselves. In additio~ they may see the situation as likely to persist across time and
likely to generalize to other events (e.g., internal, stable, global attributions). The
researchers argued that these attributions and beliefs would result in a deterioration of the
children's self-care, which would lead to a greater decline in metabolic control as well as
feelings of helplessness and depression. The results of their investigation indicated that
diabetic children who were more likely to make internal, stable, global attributions for a
variety of events tended to have worse metabolic control than diabetic children who did
-
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not have this attributional style. These results support the idea that a child's cognitive
style is associated with the course of his illness.
In a second related study, Frank, Blount, and Brown (1997) examined the
relationship between attributional style and emotional adjustment in eighty-six children
with cancer. Results indicated that children with cancer who made internal, stable, global
attributions for negative events were more likely to display depressive symptoms,
anxiety, and acting out behaviors than children with cancer who evidenced lower levels
of this attributional style. Although this study did not examine the effect of attributional
style on specific disease variables, the study does support the idea that specific cognitive
processes (e.g., internal, stable, global attributions) are associated with'psychological
distress among children with a chronic illness.
Collectively, the studies by Mullins et al. (1997), Kuttner et aI. (1990), and Frank
et al. (1997) suggest that an internal, stable, global attributional style is associated with
psychological distress and difficulty with disease management across three different
types of chronic illnesses, including asthma. The use of internal, stable, global
attributions to account for negative outcomes is consistent with refonnulated learned
helplessness theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, Seligman, & Girgus, 1986; Abramson, Seligman,
& Teasdale, 1984). Therefore, it appears that a learned helplessness conceptualization
may help explain the psychological adjustment difficulties experienced by individuals
with asthma and other chronic illnesses.
-
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The Role of Learned Helplessness in Psychological Adjustment to Asthma 1)
In 1978, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale offered a refonnulation of the
learned helplessness hypothesis as it applies to human behavior. The authors argued that
the original model failed to distinguish between universal (outcomes are uncontrollable
for all people) versus personal (outcomes are uncontrollable only for the individual)
helplessness. Further, the model failed to predict when helplessness would be expected
to be general versus specific and chronic versus acute (Abramson et al., 1978).
In order to compensate for these shortcomings, the authors proposed a
refonnuLated model of learned helplessness that heavily invoked the individual's
attributions or explanations for his helplessness in order to account for the cognitive,
emotional, motivational, and self-esteem deficits commonly observed following
experiences with non-contingency (Abramson et al., 1978). Specifically, the authors
postulated that there must first be an objective experience of non-contingency in which
the individual's efforts to control his environment do not yield the desired outcomes. The
individual must perceive this non-contingency and must propose an explanation of why
the non-contingency occurred. In other words, the individual must ask himself, "Why am
I helpless?" (Abramson et a1., 1978). If the individual's explanation of why he is helpless
results in the expectation of future non-contingency, then the individual is likely to show
the cognitive, emotional, motivational, and self-esteem deficits associated with learned
helplessness (Abramson et al., 1978).
The authors argued that individuals fonn their explanations for why they are
helpless along three continuums. The internal versus external continuum involves
detennining if the individual's failure to obtain a desired outcome is because he does not
-
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posses the necessary behavioral response needed to achieve t~e outoome (internal), or if
no relevant other individual .in the environment posses the behavior necessary to obtain
the desired outcome (external). lithe fonner attribution is made, the individual may
suffer a decrement in self-esteem, whereas self-esteem may be preserved in the latter case
(Abramson et a1., 1978).
The stable versus unstable continuum involves determining if the cause of the
helplessness is due to long-lived or recurrent factors (stable) versus short-lived or
intermittent (unstable) factors. Stable attributions are likely to result in chronic
helplessness deficits because the individual believes that he will lack the necessary
behavioral response into the foreseeable future. However, unstable attributions suggest
to the individual that he may be more successful in the future (Abramson et a1., 1978).
The global versus specific continuum involves determining if the cause of the
helplessness occurs in a broad (global) or narrow (specific) range of situations. Global
attributions imply that the individual will be helpless across a myriad of situations,
whereas specific attributions imply that helplessness will be confined to the original
situation (Abramson et aI., 1978).
Abramson et al. (1978) argue that when an individual encounters response-
outcome non-contingency, he invokes these three dimensions to explain why he
experienced helplessness. The combination of the three dimensions yields eight possible
explanations for any given occurrence of helplessness. The selection of specific
attribution patterns will determine the individual's expectation of future response-
outcome relationships, which, in tum, determines the chronicity, generality, and intensity
of the cognitive, motivational, emotional, and self-esteem deficits associated with non-
-
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contingency experiences. For example, an individual who makes an internal stable,
global attribution for the cause of non-contingency believes a factor internal to him
caused the non-contingency and that this factor is likely to persist aoross time and
situation. This individual is likely to expect non-contingency in the future and is likely to
have long-tenn learned helplessness deficits. In contrast, an individual who makes an
external, unstable, specific attribution for the cause of an event believes the event was
caused by a factor external to himself that will not persist across time and situation. This
individual is less likely than the previous individual to have expectations for future non-
contingency and, therefore, i.s likely to have less severe learned helplessness deficits
(Abramson et aI., 1978).
Chaney and colleagues (Chaney et aL, 1999) applied learned helplessness theory
to the experiences of adolescents and young adults with asthma. Building on the
arguments of Mullins et a1. (1997), Chaney et a1. (1999) argued that adolescents and
young adults with childhood onset asthma have a long learning history of experiences
with the unpredictable nature of asthma. They argued that these repeated experiences
with the capricious nature of asthma may facilitate the belief that their behavior does not
exert an influence on the outcome of their disease, thus resulting in helplessness. The
perceived lack of contingency between disease-related behaviors and disease outcomes
may then lead to negative expectations for future disease outcomes, resulting in
emotional adjustment difficulties and problems with disease management. Given the
state ofhelplessness resulting from the illness, Chaney et a1. (1999) hypothesized that
adolescents and young adults with childhood onset asthma may have been more likely to
-
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develop an internal, stable, global attributionaJ style than their same-aged peers withou
asthma.
Assuming that experiencing non-contingency would lead to increased
susceptibility to future experiences with non-contingency, Chaney et a1. (1999) sought to
determine if college students with a history of childhood onset asthma would be more
susceptible to cognitive difficulties following exposure to non-contingency in an
experimental setting than same aged peers who did not have a chronic illness history.
Thirty-nine young adults with asthma and ninety-four same-aged healthy controls
participated in the Chaney et a1. (1999) study. The experimental manipulation was
accomplished by exposing participants to one of two task conditions, one involving a
solvable task and one involving an unsolvable task. Participants in the solvable task
condition were given feedback contingent upon their performance on a puzzle task.
Participants in the unsolvable condition (or non-contingency condition) received random
feedback about their puzzle performance that was unrelated to their actual performance.
Following the manipulation of contingency, all participants solved a series of anagrams.
The results of the study indicated that participants in the unsolvable condition performed
more poorly on the anagram task than did participants in the solvable condition; however,
participants with asthma in the unsolvable condition performed significantly worse than
their healthy peers in the same condition. These results suggest that individuals with
asthma are more susceptible to learned helplessness deficits following an experience with
non-contingency than individuals who do not have asthma. Such results further suggest
that individuals with asthma may be more susceptible to the experience of non-
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contingency in the real world environment, and the subsequent cognitive emotional, and
motivational deficits that are likely to follow (Chaney et aI., 1999).
Interestingly, Chaneyet aI. (1999) also found that healthy controls in the
unsolvable condition made external attributions for the cause of their poor performance
on the anagram task, whereas the asthma participants made internal attributions for their
poor performance. Based on this finding, Chaney et aI. (1999) offered an alternative
interpretation of their findings. Specifically, they noted that previous research on the
"depressive self-focusing style" (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; p. 106) has
demonstrated that depressed individuals often make internal attributions for failure and
external attributions for success, whereas non-depressed individuals demonstrate an
opposite pattern. The depressive self-focusing style has been associated with decrements
in problem-solving performance similar to those observed in the Chaney et a1. (1999)
study (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986). Chaney et a1. (1999) noted that asthma
management requires a high degree of self-monitoring to observe potential internal signs
of an impending asthma attack or triggers within the envirorunent that might lead to an
asthma attack. This high degree of self-focus may be adaptive in situations in which the
individual's behavior can have an effect on the outcome of an event; however, high
degrees of self-focus may not be adaptive in situations in which the individual's behavior
is unlikely to have an effect on the outcome (Chaney et aI., 1999). In these latter
situations, if the individual's attention is directed on himself, he is more likely to make an
internal attribution for a negative outcome despite lacking personal control over the
situation (e.g., Fenigstein & Levine, 1984). Thus, the Chaney et a1. (1994) study
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suggested the role of self-focusing as a possible cognitive process associated with the
emotional adjustment problems ofadolescents and young adults with asthma.
Self-Focusing and Psychological Adjustment to Asthma
Chaney and colleagues (Chaney, Hommel, Uretsky, & Mullins, 2000) explored
the relationship between experiences ofnon-contingency and preferences for self-
focusing among college aged students with a history ofchildhood onset asthma. The
researchers argued that the nature of asthma management necessitates a high degree of
self-monitoring, which may ~esult in a tendency for individuals with a history of asthma
to be more likely to be self-focused than individuals without a history of asthma. In order
to investigate this hypothesis, the researchers conducted an experiment with forty
college-aged students with a history ofasthma and forty same-aged peers without a
history of asthma. The study employed the same non-contingency experimental
manipulation as was used in the Chaney et al. (1999) study. Following the experimental
induction of non-contingency, participants were given the option of working on a set of
word puzzles in the presence or absence of a mirror. Working the puzzles in the presence
ofthe mirror was the operational definition ofpreference for self-focus, while avoiding
the mirror was operationalized as avoiding self-focus.
The results of the study indicated that participants with asthma in the unsolvable
condition spent more time in front ofthe mirror than the non-asthma participants in the
same condition, and all the participants in the solvable condition. These results suggest
that individuals with asthma engage in self-focus after failure. As mentioned previously,




natural result of asthma management. However, such a high level of self-focusing ID.ay
not be adaptive in situations where the individual does not have control over the outcome.
Thus, the emotional adjustment problems observed in some individuals with asthma may
be the result ofperseverative self-focus (Chaney et aI., 2000).
Taken together, the studies conducted by Chaney and his colleagues (Chaney et
aI., 1999,2000) offer two potential explanations for the observed emotional difficulties of
adolescents and young adults with asthma. Specifically, the Chaney et a1. (1999) study
suggests that the cognitive deficits observed in that study are the result of an increased
vulnerability to the effects of non-contingency due to repeated experiences of non-
contingency associated with having asthma. This learned helplessness hypothesis
suggests that the cognitive deficits observed in the Chaney et a1. (1999) study and the
emotional adjustment problems of asthmatics observed in other studies (Mullins et aI.,
1997) may be due to experienees with non-contingency. However, results from the same
study (Chaney et aI., 1999) and results from the Chaney et al. (2000) study suggest that
individuals with asthma may develop a self-focusing cognitive style due to the high
degree of self-monitoring associated with asthma management. Research on individuals
with depression who are prone to self-focus have observed cognitive deficits similar to
those observed in the Chaney et a1. (1999) study and the emotional adjustment difficulties
observed in other studies. Thus, both the learned helplessness hypothesis and the self-
focusing hypothesis can be used to explain the cognitive deficits and emotional
adjustment difficulties of individuals with asthma. The next logical step in this line of
research appears to be to determine which of these hypotheses best accounts for the
cognitive deficits and emotional adjustment problems observed in individuals with
F'"
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asthma. However, before discussing how to distinguish between these two hypotheses, a
discussion of dispositional self-focusing and its relationship with asthma is necessary.
Dispositional Self-Focusing
Dispositional self-focusing, often referred to in social psychology literature as
self-consciousness, refers to the individual's tendency to direct their attention inward or
take to themselves as the object oftheir attention (Carver & Glass, 1976; Fenigstein et al.,
1975; Scheier & Carver, 1977, 1982). Although the social psychology literature uses the
term self-consciousness, the present study uses the term dispositional self-focusing to
represent the same concept. The use of the term dispositional self-focusi~gwill allow the
present study to maintain continuity with the previous studies from which the present
study stems.
Research indicates that there are individual differences in the tendency to be
dispositionally self-focused (Scheier & Carver, 1977; Smith & Greenberg, 1981).
Further, dispositional self-focusing (self-consciousness) can be broken down into public
versus private self-focusing. Private self-focusing refers to the tendency to focus on
one's inner thoughts and feelings while public self-focusing refers to the individual's
awareness of oneself as a social object that has an effect on others (Smith & Greenberg,
1981 ).
Dispositional self-focusing is a salient trait to examine in adolescents and young
adults with a history of childhood onset asthma because of the nature of self-management
in asthma treatment (e.g., Chaney et al., 1999,2000). Self-management of asthma
usually involves high degrees of self-monitoring or the self-collection and self-recording
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ofbehavior (Creer & Bender, 1993, 1995). One aspect of self-management involves risk-
factor analysis, in which the individual detects an internal or external stimulus and
determines the probability that this stimulus will lead to an attack based on previous
experience with the stimulus. Because an internal or external trigger may occur at any
time, individuals with asthma must constantly be aware of both their internal state and
their external environment (Creer & Bender, 1993, 1995). Thus, individuals with asthma
must constantly be self-focused to determine if they are experiencing any internal cues or
external triggers warning that an asthma attack is impending. Over time, it is possible
that individuals with asthma will become dispositionally self-focused as a result of their
experience with their asthma management.
Further, Creer and Bender (1993) note that individuals with asthma must
constantly evaluate both their internal states and their perception of potential
environmental triggers as well as signs of respiratory distress observed by other
individuals in the environment. Thus, the former experience may increase the
individual's tendency to be privately self-focused, whereas the latter experience may
increase the individual's tendency to be publicly self-focused because the individual may
have consistently been the focus of the attention of concerned parents, medical staff, and
teachers.
As Chaney et a1. (1999) noted, the increased tendency to be dispositionally self-
focused may be adaptive for individuals with asthma in certain situations. Specifically, if
the individual's self-focus allows him to detect an internal cue that an attack is coming
and the individual is able to avoid the attack, perhaps by taking medication, the individual
will make an internal attribution for this success because his attention was focused
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inward and he is likely to experience an increase in positive affect. However the
tendency towards dispositional self-focus may not be adaptive in situations in which the
individual experiences failure. Specifically. if the aforementioned situation was to occur
but the individual was unable to avoid the attack. he will make an internal attribution for
his failure and he is likely to experience negative affect. Further, the experience of the
negative internal attribution may result in subsequent deficits in problem-solving.
In sum, dispositional self-focusing may be related to asthma given that individuals
with asthma must constantly focus on their own internal states and the effect external
stimuli may have on their internal states in an attempt to manage their disease. Further,
the individual with asthma may be more aware of himself as a social obj,ect due to other
individuals evaluating the asthmatic's respiratory state. Although dispositional self-focus
may lead to positive affect and a sense of mastery in controllable situations, the tendency
to be dispositionally self-focused may lead to negative affect and problem-solving
difficulties in situations that are not controllable
Distinguishing Between Learned Helplessness and Self-Focusing Hypotheses
Distinguishing between the learned helplessness hypothesis and the self-focusing
hypothesis as possible explanations for the results observed by Ch~eyand colleagues
(Chaneyet aI., 1999; Chaney et aI., 2000) is complicated by the similarities between the
two theories. First, botb theories predict the same pattern of deficits as a result of
experiencing each. Specifically, learned helplessness has been associated with deficits in
motivation (e.g., dampened initiation of a response to a stimulus and lessened task
persistence), cognitive deficits (e.g., inability to perceive one's ability to control
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outcomes in certain situations), and emotional deficits (e.g., sadness and lowered self-
esteem) (Nolan-Hoeksema et aI., 1986). Similarly, a depressive self-focusing style has
been associated with deficits in motivation, performance (cognitive) deficits, and
emotional deficits, including negative affect and poor self-esteem (Greenberg &
Pyszczynski, 1986). Because the two theories predict the same pattern of deficits, it is
difficult to design. an experiment that is capable of distinguishing which theory is
responsible for the observed pattern of results.
Not only do both theories predict the same pattern ofdeficits, both provide the
same explanation for the reason cognitive or performance deficits are observed in each
situation. Specifically, learned helplessness theorists argue that decrements in cognitive
perfonnance are observed because of an increase in thoughts about the individual's state
of mind rather than on the problem the individual needs to solve (Mikulincer, 1986). In
other words, the individual experiences cognitive deficits when they encounter learned
helplessness because the individual is becoming self-focused. This increase in self-focus
distracts the individual from cues in the environment that might aid problem-solving.
Thus, one expects to observe increases in self-focus when conducting experiments within
a learned helplessness paradigm. Similarly, the depressive self-focusing theory would
suggest that the individual experiences perfonnance deficits when they are self-focusing
following failure because their attention is turned inward rather than directed at the
problem to be solved. Thus, it appears it would be difficult to determine which theory is
responsible for observed cognitive deficits because one would expect to observe high
levels of self-focusing in both a learned helplessness task and tasks that experimentally
induce self-focus or elicit dispositional self-focus.
-
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Finally, distinguishing between the learned helplessness hypothesis and the self-
focusing hypothesis is confounded by the nature of the attributions associated with each.
Specifically, research has demonstrated that individuals make attributions based an where
their attention is directed. Thus, if one's attention is focused on the external
environment, one would anticipate an external attribution in that situation. If one's
attention is focused internally, one would expect an internal attribution (Fenigstein &
Levine, 1984; Smith & Greenberg, 1981). This effect occurs regardless of the positive or
negative nature ofthe event or its outcomes (Duval & Wicklund, 1973). Thus, when an
individual experiences a learned helplessness paradigm and makes an internal attribution,
it is assumed that his attention is focused on himself Further, if an individual is in a state
of self-focus, it is likely that he will make an internal attribution for events that occur
while in this state (Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987; Pyszczynski & Greenberg,
1986). Thus, both the learned helplessness and the self-focusing hypotheses predict that
individuals will make internal attributions. When the outcome of the situation is
negative, these internal attributions are likely to lead to emotional distress. Therefore,
both hypotheses predict the observation of internal attributions and negative emotional
states, making it difficult to design a study capable ofdistinguishing between the two
theories.
Taken together, these arguments indicate that distinguishing between the learned
helplessness and self-focusing explanations of the results obtained by Chaney and
colleagues (Chaney et a1., 1999,2000) would be difficult. Both hypotheses predict the
same pattern of deficits, the same reason for why some of these deficits ought to be
observed, and the same pattern of attributions and subsequent emotional distress.
-
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However, the two theories can be distinguished partially by examining an assumption
made by Chaney and colleagues in their unpublished study. Specifically, Chaney and
colleagues (2000) argue that individuals with asthma develop a self-focusing cognitive
style due to the high degree of self-monitoring required by asthma management.
Therefore, individuals with asthma ought to be more self-focused, in general, than
individuals who do not have asthma. Individuals with asthma should display a tendency
towards being self-focused across a number of situations, not just following failure.
Thus, individuals with asthma should display a dispositional tendency to be self-focused.
Although observing a tendency to be dispositionally self-focused may not definitively
distinguish between the learned helplessness hypothesis and the self-focusing hypothesis,
observing a tendency for individuals with asthma to be dispositionally self-focused lends
credence to the basic assumption underlying the application of self-focusing theory to the
cognitive and emotional difficulties observed in adolescents and young adults with
asthma.
Thus, the purpose of the present study is to explore the tendency for adolescents
and young adults with asthma to display higher rates of dispositional self-focus than their
same-aged peers without a history ofchildhood-onset asthma. Further, the present study
seeks to replicate the findings from both of the studies conducted by Chaney and
colleagues (1999,2000). Specifically, the study will detennine if adolescents and young
adults with asthma display cognitive deficits following experience with non-contingency,




The present study sought to determine if older adolescents and young adults with
a history of childhood onset asthma were more likely to be dispositionally self-focused
than a cohort of same-aged peers without a history of childhood asthma, or other chronic
illness. Further, the present study sought to replicate the findings of Chaney et al. (1999)
and the unpublished study by Chaney and colleagues (2000) by determining if older
adolescents and young adults with a history of childhood onset asthma demonstrated (1)
cognitive deficits on an anagram task, (2) increased negative affect, and (3) a preference
for self-focusing following an experience with non-contingency when compared with a
cohort of same-aged peers without a history of childhood asthma or chronic illness. In
addition, given previous research demonstrating that asthma severity may be a potential
moderating variable between asthma diagnosis and psychological distress (e.g., Strunk,
1987), the present study explored the role of asthma severity in producing cognitive
deficits, negative affect, and preference for self-focus following experience with non-
contingency. However, due to the limited research focusing on asthma severity and the
unknown amount of variance in asthma severity that would be obtained in the present
study, no specific predictions regarding the role of asthma severity were made.
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In order to experimentally evaluate these ideas, college students with and without
a history ofchildhood onset asthma were recruited. All participants completed a measure
of dispositional self-focusing, which included a measure ofboth private and public self-
focusing. Participants were th.en randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the
solvable condition, participants completed a computerized standard concept fonnation
task during which they received feedback that was contingent on their performance. fu
the unsolvable condition, participants completed the same computerized standard concept
formation task; however, they received random, non-contingent feedback regarding their
performance. Following the non-contingency induction, all participants solved a series of
anagrams presented by the computer. This served as a measure ofcognitive performance
following non-contingency. Participants completed measures of their affect and
measures of their attributions for their success or failure on the computer concept
formation task. Finally, in order to measure the individual's preference for self-focus
immediately following failure, individuals were presented with an ambiguous sentence
stem and were asked to provide a phrase that completed the sentence. The phrases were
coded for references to the self.
Thus, the following hypotheses were proposed:
1. Participants with asthma will show higher scores of dispositional self-focusing,
including higher scores on the private and public self-focusing subscales, than
participants without asthma.
2. Participants with asthma in the unsolvable condition will demonstrate poorer
performance on the anagram task, higher levels of negative affect, and more
internal attributions for failure than participants without asthma in the unsolvable
32
condition and participants with and without asthma in the solvable condition.
Participants with asthma in the solvable condition are not expected to differ
significantly from the non-asthma participants on the cognitive, emotional, or
attributional measures.
3. Participants with asthma in the unsolvable condition will make more
references to themselves following an experience with failure when compared
with participants without asthma in the unsolvable condition and participants with





Two groups ofparticipants, one with a history of childhood onset asthma and one
group ofhealthy controls, were recruited from undergraduate psychology and marketing
classes at Oklahoma State University. Participants in these groups were matched for age
and gender. Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to examine the
relationship between health status and other variables, including religious coping and
problem-solving. Standardized recruitment procedures were conducted in accordance
with the institutional review board of the university; all participants received either extra
course credit or ten dollars in cash for their participation.
Forty-three participants with asthma were recruited into the study. However, two
ofthe participants failed to complete the study and one participant was unable to be
matched with a healthy control. Thus, the final asthma sample included 40 (13 males, 27
females) participants with asthma. Descriptive statistics for all variables of interest for
the final asthma sample can be viewed in Table 1 in Appendix A. Participants in the
asthma group (AS) ranged in age from 18 to 22 (M= 19.46, SD = 1.26) and were
predominantly Caucasian (87.5%), with the remainder of
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participants endorsing African American, ative American, Hispanic Asian, or Biracial
ethnicity (2.5% each).
All AS participants experienced their first asthma attack prior to the age of 12 (M
= 7.64, SD = 3.35) and were diagnosed with asthma prior to the age of 12 (M = 7.82, SD
= 3.44). Twenty-four (60%) AS participants reported having perennial asthma, 14 (35%)
reported having seasonal asthma, and 2 (5%) did not indicate the type of asthma with
which they had been diagnosed. Mean illness severity was determined by combining
each asthma participant's highest Peak Expiratory Flow Rate (PEFR) score with his or
her self-report of asthma severity, which was on a scale from 1 (mild) to 7 (respiratory
failure). Using this method, each participant was given an illness severity rating on a
scale from 1 to 4, with higher scores reflecting greater disease severity (O'Hara, 1995).
The mean illness severity rating for this asthma sample was 1.6 (SD = .63), indicating
that the average participant experienced mild to moderate asthma. Other measures of
illness severity also suggested that the AS participants experienced mild to moderate
asthma. Specifically, while 82.5% (35 participants) of the AS sample indicated that they
had a current prescription for an asthma related medication, only 12 (34.2%) of these
participants reported taking medication daily for asthma management, with the remainder
indicating that they took medication as needed for asthma management. Further, 32.5%
of the sample reported having visited a physician for an asthma-related issue within the
six months prior to participating in the study, with the mean number of asthma related
physician visits being 1.5 (SD = 1.5). The mean self-report ofasthma controllability was
4.67 (SD = 2.01) on a scale from 1 (entirely uncontrollable) to 7 (entirely controllable),
indicating that the average AS participant found their asthma to be somewhat to mostly
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controllable. Overall, it appears that the average AS participant experienced a mild lev I
of disease severity, perceived their disease to be largely controllable, and necessitated a
limited amount of medical intervention for asthma management at the time of
participation.
Forty-two healthy control (He) participants were also recruited into the study.
Two of the HC participants completed the study but their AS matches failed to complete
the study, which resulted in the two HC participants being removed from the analyses.
Thus, the final He sample consisted of40 (13 male, 27 female) participants. Descriptive
statistics for all variables of interest for the final healthy control sample can be viewed in
Table 2 in Appendix A. The HC participants ranged in age from 18 to 22 years (M =
19.52, SD = 1.32) and were predominantly Caucasian (82.5%), with the remainder
endorsing Native American (10%), Asian (2.5%), Biracial (2.5%), or Other (2.5%)
ethnicities. Participants were included in the HC group if they (1) reported no history of
a chronic illness diagnosis, (2) had never been treated by a physician for a medical
condition for more than three consecutive months in any given year and (3) had never
been hospitalized continuously for a medical condition for more than one month.
Measures and Experimental Tasks
Measures
Background Infonnation Questionnaire. A questionnaire was designed for the










in school, ethnic origin, parents' level of education, and parents' occupational status. In
addition, asthma participants were asked to report their age of asthma diagnosis, type of
asthma (seasonal versus perennial), current treatment status, and ratings of asthma
severity and controllability (Appendix B).
The Inventory to Diagnose Depression (IDD). The IDD (Zimmerman & Coryell,
1987) is a 17-item self-report scale created to document the presence of current major
depressive disorder utilizing DSM-III criteria (Appendix C) (APA, 1980). Each IDD
item consists of a group of five statements, arranged in order of increasing severity that
assesses a single DSM critetia for major depression. A scoring algorithm is used to make
decisions regarding the presence of symptoms needed to make a diagnosis of major
depression (e.g., Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987).
Research has demonstrated that the IDD is a reliable and valid measure of
depression (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987; Zimmerman & Coryell, 1988; Zimmerman,
Coryell, Wilson, & Corenthal, 1986). Specifically, test-retest reliability correlation
coefficients range from .91 to .93, Cronbach's alpha has been established at .92, and the
split half reliability as measured by the Spearman-Brown coefficient is .90 (Zimmerman
& Coryell, 1987; Zimmerman et al., 1986). Further, the IDD has been shown to have
high levels ofdiagnostic concordance with semi-structured interview schedules and
clinical ratings of depressive symptoms (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1994; Zimmerman et
al., 1986). The IDD was included in the present study in order to examine the
relationship between dispositional self-focusing and depression. Cronbach' s alpha for
this sample was high (a = 1.00).
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The Brief Symptom Inventory CBSD. The BSI (Derogatis, 1993) is a short
version of the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1983). Whereas
the SCL-90-R contains 90 items, the BSI consists of only 53 short items (Appendix D).
The BSI yields measures of nine clinical dimensions ofpsychological distress with t-
scores ranging from 30 to 80. Research demonstrates that the BSI is highly correlated
with the SCL-90-R, has high internal consistency (.71 to .85), and possesses high test-
retest reliability (.68 to .91) (Derogatis, 1993). Respondents in the current study were
asked to indicate on a 4-point scale the frequency with which they have experienced
various psychological or physiological symptoms within the previous seven days. The
Global Severity Index (GSI) score from the BSI was used to assess overall psychological
adjustment. Cronbach's alpha for this sample was high (a= .97).
The BSI also allows researchers to examine T scores in terms of caseness (i.e.,
GSI T score::: 63, or two or more subscale scores::: 63). The BSI caseness criteria is
considered to provide a good indicator of a positive case, although research regarding
caseness on sensitivity and specificity is better developed for the SCL-90-R (Derogatis,
1993). Caseness criterion for maladaptation with the SCL-90-R has been used in a
number of studies examining adaptation to chronic illness (e.g., Mullins et aI., 1997;
Thompson, Gustafson, Hamlett, & Spock, 1992).
The Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAAeL). The MAACL (Zuckerman
& Lubin, 1965) is a 132-item adjective checklist that assesses transient mood states
(Appendix E). The adjectives used on the MAACL represent three different mood states,
including anxiety (e.g., afraid), depression (e.g., wilted), and hostility (e.g., angry).
Respondents are given the instructions: "Please check the words that you feel apply to
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you right now, at this moment" Mood adjective items are scored as either present (1) or
absent (0). Some items contain positive mood adjectives, which are scored if not
endorsed. The items representing each mood state are summed and divided by the total
number ofwords available for each mood state (i.e., 21 for anxiety, 40 for depression,
and 28 for hostility). The resulting scores represent the respondent's transient level of
anxiety, depression, and hostility.
The MAACL was utilized in this study to evaluate participants' affective
responses to the experimental manipulation (i.e., contingent versus non-contingent
feedback). The experimental manipulation was expected to increase anxiety, depression,
and hostility in the non-contingent condition. Previous research has demonstrated that
the MAACL is sensitive to changes in transient moods in studies utilizing experimental
induction procedures (e.g., Cairns & Norton, 1988; Nagata & Trierweiler, 1988).
Silverglade et a1. (1994) demonstrated that the MAACL was able to discriminate among
moods across varying levels of asthma severity.
The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS). The SCS (Fenigstein et aI., 1975) is a 23-
item scale designed to assess individual differences in the tendency to focus one's
attention on oneself(i.e., dispositional self-focusing) (Appendix F). Respondents read
each statement and rate how much each statement applies to them on a Likert-type scale
ranging from 0 ("extremely uncharacteristic of me") to 4 ("extremely characteristic of
me"). The SCS yields three factor-analytically derived scale scores including private
self-consciousness (i.e., attention to one's inner thoughts and feelings), public self-
consciousness (i.e., awareness ofthe self as a social object), and social anxiety (i.e.,
measures the individual's level of discomfort in the presence of others) (Fenigstein et aI.,
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1975). Research has demonstrated the reliability as well as the discriminant and
construct validity of the SCS (e.g., Carver & Glass, 1976; Smith & Greenberg, 1981;
Tumer, Carver. Scheier, & Ickes, 1978). The SCS was included in the present study as a
measure of dispositional self-focusing. Cronbach's alpha for this sample was high (Il=
.84).
Visual Analog Scale (VAS). The VAS is a single, 10-centimeter line on which
participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they expect to succeed on an
upcoming computer task (Appendix G and H). The scale on the VAS ranges from 0
("much worse than most people") to 10 ("much better than most people"). Participants in
the current study were asked to place an X on the line indicating how well they expected
to perfonn on the upcoming computer task. The same procedure was repeated prior to
the anagram task. Participants again were asked to indicate how they expected to
perfonn on an upcoming computer task. The VAS ratings were used to assess the effects
of the experimental manipulation on outcome expectancies as a result of experiencing
contingent or non-contingent feedback. Specifically, participants who experienced non-
contingency were expected to show a decline in their expectation for success on the
computerized anagram task as a result of their previous experience with non-contingency.
In a review of the literature on the use of visual analog scales, Ahearn (1997) concluded
that such scales, in general, have acceptable reliability and validity, are easy for
participants to comprehend, and yield high rates of participant compliance.
Internal-External Attributions. A single item assessed participants' internal
versus external attributions for their perfonnance on the experimental computerized task
both prior to and after completing the task (Appendix G and H). Specifically,
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participants were asked, "Do you think that your perfonnance on the computer task ( ill
be/was) due to something about you or due to other circumstances?" The design of this
item is similar to items on the Attributional Style Questionnaire (peterson, Semmel, von
Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982). Participants' responses could range
from one ("totally due to other circumstances") to seven ("totally due to me"). Higher
scores reflect more internal attributions for performance on the experimental
computerized task. The use of the internal-external attribution measure allowed for
observation of changes in locus ofcontrol that occurred due to the experimental
manipulation.
Experimental Tasks
Contingency Task. The experimental task that was utilized in the present study
was a computerized version ofa standard concept-formation task (e.g., Levine, 1971),
similar to the task originally used by Hiroto and Seligman (1975) and others (e.g.,
Benson & Kennelly, 1976). During the experimental task, participants were seated at a
computer terminal in a private room and given the following standardized instructions.
"In this task, you will be presented with several pr<?blems. Each problem
consists of a series of displays like the one in the bottom right hand comer of the
screen. Each display will contain a letter 'V' and a letter' Z'. You will also see
that one letter will be surrounded by a square and the other by a circle. Also, one
background will be red and the other will be blue. Every display will be like this
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one except that the letters, the surrounding shapes, and the backgrQund colors ill
be combined in different ways.
One of the two patterns, either the top or the bottom, has been c:hos n to
be the right pattern. For each display, you are to indicate which of these two you
think is the right pattern and the computer will tell you whether you are 'right' or
'wrong'. Then you will go on to the next display, again you will make a choice,
and again the computer will teU you if you are 'right' or 'wrong'.
In this way, you can learn the reason for the computer saying 'right' or
'wrong'. The reason may be because of the letter, the surrounding shape, or the
background color. The object for you is to figure this out as faSt as possible so
that you can choose correctly as many times as possible.
For each display, you are to indicate which of the two patterns you think. is
right and the computer will tell you whether you are 'right' or 'wrong'. To
choose a pattern, click it once."
Participants were given examples of how the task works. After the examples, the
computer presented the participants with forty stimulus patterns grouped into four sets of
ten problems. After the tenth problem in each set, the stimulus dimension (e.g., the letter
Y) associated with a correct response changed automatically such that the participant had
to determine which stimulus dimension was now correct (e.g., the color blue).
As part of the standardized instructions, all participants were lead to believe that
the task was solvable and that detennining the correct stimulus dimension was attainable.
However, only participants in the contingent-feedback condition were given solvable
problems with response-contingent correct and incorrect feedback about their
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perfonnance. In other words, only participants in the contingent-feedbackoondition were
given feedback that facilitated the discovery of the correct stimulus dimension.
Participants in the non-contingent-feedback condition received unsolvable problems with
feedback that was not contingent upon their actual perfonnance. The random
perfonnance feedback provided to participants in this condition did not allow them to
solve the problems successfully.
After completing the concept-formation task, the researcher displayed the
participant's score and commented on the participant's performance. For participants in
the contingent-feedback condition, the experimenter said, "Hmm, it looks like you did
very well. You got 20 correct. That's one of the highest scores that I have ever seen.
The average score is about 15." For participan.ts in the non-contingent-feedback
condition, the experimenter said, "Hmm, it looks like you did not do very well. You got
15 correct. I guess you're not very good at this sort of thing. The average score is about
20."
Self-Focus Sentence Completion Task (SFSC). The SFSC (Exner, 1973) is a 30-
item sentence completion task. The respondent is provided with the first phrase of a
sentence and is asked to complete the sentence in any way he or she chooses (Appendix
I). Each of the participant's responses was categorized as reflecting self-focus (e.g., I
was happiest when 1 was alone.), external world focus (e,g., I was happiest when I was
with Mary), or neutral responses (e.g., I was happiest when the sun was shining). Exner
(1973) notes that individuals who provide more self-focus responses than external world
















spend more time looking at themselves in a mirror than individuals who do not
demonstrate this pattern of responses.
The SFSC was used in the present study to assess participants' degr e of self-
focusing immediately following the computerized concept-formation task. The SFSC has
been utilized in other studies (e.g., Greenberg & Pyzczynski, 1986~ Carver & Scheier,
1978) to assess spontaneous self-focusing. Categorizing SFSC responses was assessed
for inter-rater reliability prior to use in analyses.
Anagram Task. The present study included a computerized anagram-solving task
containing twenty anagrams with five letters per anagram. The purpose of this task was
to measure changes in performance and motivation following experiencing non-
contingency in the concept-fonnation task. All anagrams were presented in the same
scrambled order (i.e., 3-4-2-5-1) and were solvable in the same sequence (i.e., 5-3-1-2-4)
(e.g. Alloy, Peterson, Abramson, & Seligman, 1984; Benson & Kennelly, 1976; Hiroto &
Seligman, 1975). Participants were given the following standardized instructions to
complete the anagram task:
"You will be asked to solve some anagrams. Anagrams are words with
the letters scrambled. The problem for you is to unscramble the letters so that
they fonn a word. When you have found the word, type it into the computer
keyboard. Notice that there may be a pattern or principal by which to solve the
anagrams. But, that's up to you to figure out.
You will have 100 seconds to solve each anagram before the next one is
presented. If you guess incorrectly, you may try again and again until the time is




















Participants were then presented with the twenty anagrams and were given 100 seconds
to solve each anagram. Each participant's total number of incorrect anagrams and the
mean latency between onset of the anagram and providing the correct response were
recorded.
Peak Expiratory Flow Rate. In addition to questions about subjective asthma
severity ratings presented on the demographic fonn, objective infonnation about lung
functioning was collected from all participants via a measure of peak: expiratory flow rate
(PEFR). PEFR, measured in Umin, assesses the volume of air that can be forcefully
exhaled in a single breath. PEFR varies with age, gender, and height (O'Hara, 1995;
Nunn & Gregg, 1989). Lower levels ofPEFR imply more significant levels ofdisease
process (O'Hara, 1995).
In the present study, PEFR was assessed with a MiniWright Peak Flow Meter
(Model # 3103001). Participants were given one practice trial to ensure proper use of the
meter followed by three test trials. The highest value of the three test measurements was
used as an objective measure of lung functioning. See Appendix J for the record form
used for the PEFR ratings in the current study.
Consent for Follow-Up. At the end of the second session, the experimenter
explained that he or she would like to gather some additional infonnation about each
participant. Specifically, for the healthy control participants, the experimenter requested
consent to obtain the participant's cumulative grade point average (GPA) and GPA for
the previous semester from the university's registrar. For individuals for whom the
semester of participation was their first semester of college, the experimenter requested to












GPA. For the asthma participants, the experimenter requested pennission to obtain the
same GPA infonnation as well as pennission to contact the participant's parents for
confinnation of asthma diagnosis, the participant's primary physician for a rating of
asthma severity, and pennission to contact the participant in the future to obtain follow-
up data related to the current project. The experimenter empbasized that consenting to
provide this additional infonnation was optional and that the participant's course credit or
monetary compensation would not be affected by refusal to consent to provide this
information. Further, the experimenter emphasized that the participant had the option of
consenting to provide some but not all of this infonnation. Consent forms for the follow-
up measures can be viewed in Appendix K.
Procedure
Participants were tested in two individual sessions for this study. The first session
included completion of a questionnaire battery and PEFR measures. Upon arrival at the
laboratory, each participant was seated at a table and asked to read and sign an infonned-
consent form (Appendix L). After signing the informed consent, the He participants
completed the practice trial and first trial of the PEFR measure with a two-minute rest
period in between trials. HC participants then completed the questionnaire battery,
which included the background information questionnaire, the IDD, the aSI, and the
SCS. The questionnaire battery included a few other questionnaires that were part of a
related, but separate project. After completing the questionnaire packet, the HC
participants completed the second and third trials of the PEFR measure, an appointment




After signing the consent fonn,. AS participants completed the practice trial and
first trial of the PEFR measure with a two-minute rest period in between trials.
Following the first PEFR measurement, AS participants completed the questionnaire
battery followed by two additional PEFR measurements with a two-minute rest period
between measurements. After the last PEFR measurement, an appointment for the
second session was scheduled and the participant was dismissed.
The second individual session occurred within four weeks ofthe first session.
The mean number of days between sessions was 8.48 (SD =6.40). Prior to the
participant's arrival, the exp~rimenter had randomly assigned the participant to one of the
two experimental conditions (e.g., contingent versus non-contingent feedback on the
concept-fonnation task). Prior to beginning the second session, the experimenter
reminded the participant that he or she signed an informed consent during the first session
and that the participant had the right to discontinue participation at any time without
penalty.
The procedure for the second session occurred in five phases: (1) Pre-treatment
Phase - participants completed the MAACL (time one), the VAS (time one), and the
internal-external attribution question (time one); (2) Treatment Phase - participants were
administered the computerized concept-formation task in which they received either
contingent or non-contingent feedback about their performance; (3) Post-treatment phase
- participants completed the MAACL (time two), the VAS (time two), the internal-
external attribution question (time two) and the SFSC task; (4) Performance Phase-
participants completed the anagram task; and (5) debriefing - following completion of









the study and the expected results to be gained from the research. The debriefing
statement can be viewed in Appendix M. As part of the debriefing, all participants in the
solvable condition were asked to write down an explanation ofhow they went about
solving the problems during the concept formation task (Appendix N). The explanation
was reviewed at a later time to ensure that the participant understood he or she was to
choose one dimension ofthe problem as the correct answer and was then to change his or
her answer based on the feedback provided by the computer. For all participants, the
debriefing also included a review of possible reactions and feelings that participants
might have experienced as a result of the study. Referral sources were provided in case
follow-up for exacerbated emotional reactions was necessary (Appendix 0). After
providing the participant with referral infonnation, the experimenter presented






Several independent samples t-tests were first conducted to determine if the AS
and HC groups differed in their level of depression and general psychological distress
prior to the experiment. Means and standard deviations for these analyses can be found
in Table 1 of Appendix P. The analyses indicated that the AS and HC participants did
not differ in their mean level of depression as measured by the IDD (t(l, 78) = 1.48, p =
.14). Additional analyses indicated that the two groups did not differ in their overall
mean level of psychological distress as assessed by T-scores on the as!' s Global Severity
Index (GSI) (t (1, 78) = 1.78, P = .08). Further, the analyses indicated that the AS and
HC groups did not differ on their mean T-score on several aSI subscales including
Depression, Obsessive-Compulsiveness, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Anxiety, Hostility,
Phobic Anxiety, Psychoticism, and Paranoid Ideation. The AS mean T-score on the aSI
Somatization subscale was significantly higher than the HC mean T-score for this
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subscale (t( 1, 78) = 3.30, p = .001). Relevant means, standard deviations, and test
statistics can be found in Table 2 of Appendix P.
In addition to examining mean differences on the BSI subscaies, chi-square
analyses were conducted to determine if the frequency with which participants met
caseness criteria for the BSI and the IDD differed between the AS and HC groups.
Participants met caseness criteria for the BSI if their GSI T-score was greater than 63 or
if two individual subscales had T-scores greater than 63 (Derogatis, 1993). The BSI
caseness criteria serves as a means ofdefining clinically significant levels of distress,
thereby indicating a potential need for clinical intervention. The results indicated that the
rate at which participants met BSI caseness criteria did not differ significantly across the
AS and HC groups (X2(1, N = 80) = .88, p = .35). Participants also were classified
according to the IDD caseness criteria to determine if each participant met DSM-III-R
criteria for depression. The results indicated that the rate at which participants met IDD
caseness criteria did not differ across the AS and HC groups (~(1, N = 79) = .50,p =
.48). These result suggest that participants in the AS condition were not more likely to be
experiencing psychological distress than the individuals in the HC condition, See Table 2
of Appendix P for relevant frequencies.
Although the frequency with which the AS and HC participants met caseness
criteria for the BSI was not significantly different, it is important to note that the rate for
meeting caseness criteria across the two groups was higher than what has been previously
found in normative samples. Specifically, normative data suggest that 10% of the
population should meet caseness criteria at any given point in time (Derogatis & Spencer,




(30%) HC participants met caseness criteria. These results suggest that the curr nt
sample contained a fairly high number of individuals in both the AS and He groups who
could be considered at risk for psychological adjustment problems. It is noteworthy that
the data collection occurred during the six- to nine-month period following the tragic
events of September II, 2001. Thus, the elevated levels of psychological distress in both
groups may be attributable to the aftermath of these events.
In order to determine if the AS and HC participants differed in their mean level of
lung functioning prior to the experiment, an independent samples t-test was conducted
using the mean highest PEFR rating as the dependent variable. The results of the analysis
indicated that the AS and He groups did not differ prior to the experiment in regards to
their mean level of lung functioning (t(l,78) = -.86, p = .39). These results suggest that
the majority of the participants in the AS group may have more closely resembled peers
without a history of asthma than individuals with a more severe disease course. These
results provide additional evidence that the AS sample utilized in this study may have
experienced limited impairment from their illness. See Table 3 of Appendix P for
relevant means and standard deviations.
Primary Analyses
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis of the present study predicted that participants
with asthma would show higher dispositional self-focusing scores (including scores on
the private and public self-focusing subscales and the social anxiety subscale), as















order to test this hypothesis, four independent samples t-tests were conducted. Three of
the HC participants failed to complete this measure. In order to maintain the matched
design utilized for the present study, these three HC participants and their AS
counterparts were not included in this analysis. Because a specific direction for the
nature of the observed differences was predicted, one-tailed significance levels were
utilized for this analysis. Relevant means and standard deviations are presented in Table
4 ofAppendix P.
The analyses indicated that the AS and HC groups did not differ in their mean
scores on the total SCS score (t(l, 72) = .465,p = .32). However, the participants in the
AS group evidenced significantly higher mean scores on the private self-consciousness
subscale than the participants in the HC group (t( 1, 72) = 1.64, P = .05). In contrast, the
analyses indicated that the AS and HC groups did not differ in their mean scores on the
public self-consciousness subscale (t(l, 72) = .703, p = .24) and the social anxiety
subscale (t(l, 72) = -1.24, P = .11). These results suggest that AS participants may
indeed have a greater tendency to focus on their inner thoughts and feelings than HC
participants. However, the two groups do not appear to differ in their tendency to focus
on themselves as a social object or in their level of social anxiety.
Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis of the present study focused on the
responses of the AS and HC participants to the experimental manipulation ofcontingent
versus non-contingent feedback. Specifically, the study predicted that AS participants in
the non-contingent condition would demonstrate poorer performance on the anagram
task, higher levels of negative affect, and more internal attributions for failure than HC
participants in the same condition and all participants in the contingent condition. In
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order to evaluate this hypothesis a series of Analysis of Variance tests (ANOVAs) were
conducted.
The first analysis was a 2 (AS vs. HC) X 2 (contingent feedback vs. non-
contingent feedback) ANOVA using the number of anagrams incorrectly solved as the
dependent variable. Relevant means and standard deviations are in Table 5 of Appendix
P. The analysis revealed no significant main effect of health status (F( 1, 76) = 1.81, P =
.18), no significant main effect of feedback condition (F( 1, 76) = 1.47, P = .23), and no
significant interaction (F(I, 76) = 1.16, P = .29). These results suggest that the
contingent versus non-contingent feedback did not have an effect on the participants'
performance on the subsequent anagram task, regardless of health status.
The second analysis was a series of2 (AS vs. HC) X 2 (contingent feedback vs.
non-contingent feedback) X 2 (time one vs. time two) repeated measures ANOVAs with
health status and feedback conditions as between subjects factors and timing ofthe
MAACL measurement as a within subject factor. The three subscales of the MAACL
(depression, anxiety, and hostility) served as the dependent variables. Relevant means
and standard deviations are in Table 6 ofAppendix P. The MAACL was utilized in the
present study as a measure of negative affect prior to and after the contingent or non-
contingent feedback.
The analysis of the depression subscale revealed a significant time by condition
interaction (F(l, 76) = 12.93, P < .01). This result suggests that the individuals in the
non-contingent feedback condition experienced higher levels oftransient depression than
the participants in the contingent condition after the experimental manipulation. The











(F(l, 76) = .85,p = .36), no significant main effect of feedback condition (F(l 76);:::
1.36, P = .25), no significant main effect of time (F(l, 76) = 3.39, p = .07), no significant
health status by feedback condition interaction (F(l, 76) = .005 ,p =.94) no significant
health status by time interaction (F(l, 76) = .l7,p = .68), and no significant health status
by feedback condition by time interaction (F(l, 76) = .19, p = .66). Thus, taken together,
these results suggest that while the experimental manipulation appeared to increase
transient depression in the participants in the non-contingent condition, this effect did not
have a differential impact on participants with asthma in the non-contingent condition
when compared to healthy control participants in the same condition and all participants
in the contingent condition as predicted.
The analysis of the anxiety subscale revealed a significant time by condition
interaction (F(l, 76) = 15.45, P < .01). This result suggests that the individuals in the
non-contingent feedback condition experienced higher levels of transient anxiety than the
participants in the contingent condition after the experimental manipulation. The analysis
of the anxiety subscale revealed no significant main effect of health status (F(l, 76) = .65,
p = .42), no significant main effect of feedback condition (F(l, 76) = 1.21, P = .28), no
significant main effect of time (F(l, 76) = 1.39,p =.24), no significant health status by
feedback condition interaction (F(l, 76) = .005 ,p = .94), no significant health status by
time interaction (F(l, 76) = .62,p = ..43), and no significant health status by feedback
condition by time interaction (F(l, 76) = .04,p = .85). Thus, taken together, these results
again suggest that while the experimental manipulation appeared to increase anxiety in
the participants in the non-contingent condition, this effect did not have a differential
impact on participants with asthma in the non-contingent condition when compared to
-
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healthy control participants in the same condition and .all participants in the contingent
condition as predicted.
The analysis of the hostility subscale revealed a significant main effect of time
(F(1, 76) = 14.l8,p < .01) However, this effect was qualified by a significanttime by
condition interaction (F( 1, 76) = 11.23, P < .01). This result suggests that the individuals
in the non-contingent feedback condition experienced higher levels of transient hostility
than the participants in the contingent condition after the experimental manipulation. The
analysis of the hostility subscale revealed no significant main effect ofhealth status (F(l,
76) = .05,p = .83), no significant main effect of feedback condition (F(I, 76) = .51,p =
.48), no significant health status by feedback condition interaction (F(l, 76) = .003 ,p =
.95), no significant health status by time interaction (F( 1, 76) = .02, p = .90), and no
significant health status by feedback condition by time interaction (F(l, 76) = .62,p =
.43). Thus, taken together, these results suggest that while the experimental manipulation
appeared to increase hostility in the participants in the non-contingent condition, this
effect did not have a differential impact on participants with astluna in the non-contingent
condition when compared to healthy control participants in the same condition and all
participants in the contingent condition as predicted.
In order to detennine if the AS participants in the non-contingent condition made
more internal attributions for failure following the experimental manipulation than He
participants in the same condition and all participants in the contingent condition, two 2
(AS vs. He) x 2 (contingent feedback vs. non-contingent feedback) X 2 (time one versus
time two) ANOVAs were conducted. Relevant means and standard deviations are in
Table 7 ofAppendix P. The first ANOVA used the participants VAS scores as the
..
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dependent variable. As mentioned previously, the VAS isa measure of the participant's
expectation for success on an upcoming task, with higher scores reflecting higher
expectations for success. The VAS was administered immediately prior to the
contingency manipulation and immediately prior to the anagram task. Thus, the first
measure reflected the participant's expectation for success on the contingency task and
the second measure reflected the participant's expectation for success on the anagram
task. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of feedback condition (F(l, 76) =
15.22, P< .01) and a significant main effect oftime (F(l, 76) = 31.69,fr< .01). These
effects were qualified by a significant time by feedback condition interaction (F(l, 76) =
52.57, P < .01). These results indicate that the participants did not expect to do as well on
the second task, but this effect only occurred for the participants in the non-contingent
condition. The analysis revealed no significant main effects of health status (F(1, 76) =
2.02, p = .16), no significant time by health status interaction (F(1, 76) = .Ol,p = .01), no
significant feedback condition by health status interaction (F(I,76) = 1.87, p = .18), and
no significant time by feedback condition by health status interaction (F( 1, 76) =2.37, P
= .13).
The second ANOVA utilized the participants' internal attributions as the
dependent variable. Prior to the contingency task and the anagram task, participants were
asked to indicate the extent to which their success on the next task was due to something
about the circumstance or something about themselves. Higher scores reflected the belief
that success was due to the self. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of time
(F(l, 76) = 4.54, P = .04). This result suggests that prior to the second task, the
participant's believed that their success would be more dependent on external factors than
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on internal factors. The analysis. re ealed no significanl main effect of feedbaok
condition (F( I, 76) = .16, p = .69), no significant main effect of health status (P(l 76) =
.14,p = .70), no significant time by feedback condition interaction (F(l, 76) = .04, p =
.84), no significant time by health status interaction (F(l, 76) = .002, p = .97), no
significant feedback condition by health status interaction (F(l, 76) = .53,p = .47), and
no significant time by feedback condition by health status interaction (F(l, 76) = 1.01, p
= .32).
Overall, the analyses related to the participants' reaction to the experimental task
suggest that the experimental manipulation was effective. Specifically, the contingent and
non-contingent conditions did not differ in their mean level of negative affect,
expectation for success, or internal attributions for'success prior to the manipulation.
However, following the manipulation, participants in the non-contingent condition
evidenced higher levels of transient depression, anxiety, and hostility, suggesting that
they found the task aversive and were temporarily distressed by the experience. Further,
the participants in the non-contingent condition did not expect to do as well on the second
task following their experience with non-contingency, suggesting that the participants
understood that they had performed poorly on the previous task. However, contrary to
the predictions of the study, the effect of the experimental manipulation did not affect the
participants' performance on the anagram task. Further, contrary to the predictions of the
study, the experimental manipulation did not appear to have a differential effect on the
AS participants in the non-contingent condition when compared to He participants in the
same condition and all participants in the contingent condition on any of the dependent
variables (e.g., anagram performance, negative affect, and internal attributions). Thus,
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while it appears that the experimental manipulation was successful, the differential
effects on the AS participants in the non-contingent condition were not observed, which
indicates no support for the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The third hypothesis of the study predicted that AS participants in
the non-contingent condition would make more references to themselves during a
sentence completion task following their experience with non-contingency when
compared to healthy control participants in the same condition and all participants in the
contingent condition. Prior to testing this hypothesis, the participants' responses to the
sentence completion task wer~ categorized into one of three categories by three
undergraduate research assistants. Each response was categorized as referring to the self
(e.g., I was happiest when I was alone), referring to a specific external object or person
(e.g., I was happiest when I was with Mary), or as an "other" response meaning that the
response did not refer to the self or a specific external object (e.g., I was happiest when
the sun was shining). The research assistants received training with the coding system, a
modified version of the system presented by Exner (1973), until they reached an
acceptable level of inter-rater reliability (a = .80). Once this level of reliability was
reached, two coders were assigned to each participant's responses. The coders
independently categorized each of the participant's responses. After the coding process,
the inter-rater reliability level remained acceptable (a = .82). The coders then discussed
responses on which they disagreed and came to a consensus regarding the final
classification of reach response.
In order to test the third hypothesis, a series of2 (AS vs. He) x 2 (contingent
feedback vs. non-contingent feedback) ANOVAs were conducted. The number of
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sentences referencing the self, external objects, and other responses were used as the
dependent variables. See Table 8 in Appendix P for relevant means and standard
deviations. The first ANOVA utilized the number of references to the self as the
dependent variable. The analysis yielded no significant main effect of feedback
condition (F(l, 76) = 1.08, p = .30), no significant main effect ofhealth status (F(I, 76) =
1.08, p = .30), and no significant feedback condition by health status interaction (F(1, 76)
=.l1,p = .75).
The second ANOYA utilized the number of references to specific external objects
or people as the dependent variable. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of
health status (F(l, 76) = 1O.14,p < .01). This result suggests that the AS participants
made more references to specific external objects and people than HC participants,
regardless of their feedback condition. No significant main effe·ct of feedback condition
(F( 1, 76) = .30, p = .59) and no significant feedback condition by health status interaction
(F(l, 76) = .39, p = .54) were found.
The third ANOVA utilized the number ofother references as the dependent
variable. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of health status (F(I, 76) = 6.24,
p =.02). This result suggests that the HC participants made more references that could
not be classified as references to the self or an external object than AS participants,
regardless of their feedback condition. No significant main effect of feedback condition
(F( 1, 76) = 1.17, p = .28) and no significant feedback condition by health status
interaction (F(1, 76) = .07, P = .80) were found.
Taken together, the results related to hypothesis three indicate that the AS
participants in the non-contingent condition did not make more references to themselves
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following a failure experience than He participants in the same condition and all
participants in the contingent condition. The results do suggest that the AS participants
were more likely to make references to specific external objects and people than HC
participants, regardless of feedback condition. Conversely, HC participants provided
more responses to the sentence stems that couLd not be classified as a reference to the self




The purpose of the present study was to examine differences in dispositional self-
focus, reactions to failure, and the tendency to be self-focused in a sample of college-
aged individuals with a history of childhood onset asthma. Participants with asthma and a
matched sample of healthy peers were exposed to a failure task and subsequently
evaluated on measures of transient affect, self-focus, and problem-solving ability. It was
believed that the results of the present study could help distinguish between two
explanations for previous findings in which a sample of college-aged individuals with
asthma demonstrated poorer performance on a cognitive task following failure when
compared to individuals with no chronic illness history, as well as to individuals with and
without asthma who did not experience failure prior to the cognitive task (Chaney et aI.,
1999). The first explanation for these findings posited that individuals with asthma
experience repeated exposure to behavior-outcome non-contingency due to the variable
and unpredictable nature of asthma, resulting in increased vulnerability to the effects of
environmental non-contingency (Chaney et aI., 1999). The second explanation argues
that because asthma management requires a high degree of self-monitoring, individuals
develop a tendency to be habitually self-focused, which may interfere with performance
6l
on a subsequent cognitive task and increase psychological distress following failure
(Chaney et aI., 2000).
To distinguish between these two potential explanations, the present study
gathered data related to dispositional self-focus, cognitive and emotional reactions to
failure, and the tendency to be self-focused immediately following failure in a sample of
college-aged students with and without a history of chronic illness. Specific predictions
regarding each of these variables and the results from the present study will be discussed
in the following sections.
Dispositional Self-Focus
The present study predicted that individuals with a history of childhood onset
asthma would evidence higher scores on a measure of dispositional self-focus than
individuals without a chronic illness history. The measure of dispositional self-focus
used in the present study included a measure of private self-consciousness, or the
tendency to focus on one's inner thoughts and feelings, public self-consciousness, or the
tendency to be aware of oneself as a social object that has an effect on others, and social
anxiety (Fenigstein et aI., 1975). The results of the study indicated,that the asthma
participants demonstrated significantly higher scores on the private self-focus subscale
than the healthy participants. However, no significant differences were observed on the
public self-consciousness or social anxiety subscales or the total scale score.
The finding that individuals with asthma scored higher on a measure of private




Specifically, self-management ofasthma symptoms often involves a high degre of self-
monitoring during which the individual scans the internal and external environment for
stimuli that may trigger an asthma attack. The individual then detennines the probability
that this stimulus will result in an asthma attack based on previous interactions with the
stimulus. Because an individual with asthma may experience an asthma attack at any
given time, the need for self-monitoring is constant (Creer & Bender, 1993, 1995). Given
the need for a high degree of self-monitoring, it seems logical that individuals with
asthma would develop a habitual tendency to reflect not only on their internal state as it
relates to their asthma, but also on the myriad of other aspects of their internal thoughts
and feelings.
The tendency to be dispositionally self-focused may have both positive and
negative consequences for individuals with asthma. An individual's attribution for why a
particular behavior occurs tends to be consistent with the orientation of their attention.
Thus, if an individual is internally focused, he is likely to make an intemal causal
attribution; conversely, ifhis attention is externally focused, he is likely to make an
external causal attribution. If individuals with asthma are habitually internally focused,
they are likely to make internal attributions both following success and following failure
experiences (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Fenigstein & Levine, 1984; Fenigstein et aI.,
1975). Although making an internal attribution following success may potentially bolster
self-efficacy, making internal attributions for failure has been associated with negative
affect and decreased self-esteem (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985). If individuals with
asthma are habitually internally focused, they are hypothetically at risk for making
internal attributions for failure, which may thereby increase their risk for psychological
L
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distress. The finding that approximately one-third of the asthma participants in this study
experienced c1inical1y significant levels of distress is consistent with the notion that a
habitual internal focus may be associated with psychological distress. However, this
interpretation of the study's findings is made with caution given that the rate of
psychological distress in the healthy control sample was approximately equal to the
asthma sample, while the healthy control participants evidenced lower scores on the
private self-consciousness scale.
Such results are preliminary, and additional research is needed to replicate this
finding in a larger sample of individuals with asthma. It is important that such research
involve individuals with more severe asthma, who may have a higher need for self-
monitoring of asthma symptoms than the participants in the present study. If additional
research indicates that individuals with asthma are more likely to be habitually self-
focused than individuals without asthma, the inclusion of attribution training into the
psychological management of asthma may be necessary. Specifically, individuals with
asthma may benefit from interventions that help them evaluate potential external
explanations for failure, thereby preventing unnecessary or erroneous internal attributions
for failure.
Cognitive and Emotional Reactions to Failure
The present study adopted the methodology used by Chaney et al. (1999) to
explore the effects of presenting college-aged individuals with and without a history of
childhood onset asthma with feedback that either facilitated or interfered with successful
problem solving. In the Chaney et al. (1999) study, individuals with asthma who
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received feedback about a puzzle task that was not contingent on their actual perfonnance
perfonned more poorly on a subsequent cognitive task than healthy individuals who also
received non-contingent feedback and individuals with and without a history of asthma
who received contingent feedback. The present study predicted the same pattern of
results. However, the results of the present study failed to find that participants with
asthma in the non-contingent condition made more errors on an anagram task following
the contingency manipulation than healthy control participants in the same condition and
all participants in the contingent condition.
The present study also hypothesized that the asthma participants would
demonstrate higher levels of negative affect following their experience with non-
contingency than healthy participants in the same condition and all participants in the
contingent condition. The results indicated, however, that while all participants in the
non-contingent condition had higher levels of depression, anxiety, and hostility following
the contingency manipulation than participants in the contingent condition, the
manipulation did not appear to have a differential effect on the asthma participants in the
non-contingent condition as was predicted. The finding that all participants in the non-
contingent condition had higher levels of negative affect compared to the participants in
the contingent condition following the contingency manipulation i~ important because it
suggests that the experimental manipulation was effective. Specifically, the fact that the
participants in the non-contingent condition experienced negative affect following the
contingency manipulation suggests that they were frustrated by the task and that they
found the situation aversive. The increased level of negative affect within the non-
contingent condition is consistent with other research that has utilized a similar
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methodology (e.g., Brier, Albus, Pickar, Zahn, Wolkowitz, & Paul, 1987; Gatchel,
Paulus, & Maples, 1975). Thus, it appears that the experimental manipulation utilized in
the present study was effective in producing the transient affect effects associated with
experimentally induced learned helplessness, but the differential effects that were
predicted for the asthma participants in the non-contingent condition did not materialize.
The study also predicted that participants with asthma in the non-contingent
condition would evidence more internal attributions for failure following the contingency
manipulation than healthy control participants in the same condition and all participants
in the contingent condition. This hypothesis was explored with two variables. First,
participants' ratings of how much they expected to succeed on an upcoming task were
analyzed. The results indicated that participants in the non-contingent condition did not
expect to perform as well on the second task as they expected to perform on the first. task.
However, there was no differential effect for the asthma participants in the non-
contingent condition as predicted. The second variable explored the participants'
attributions regarding the cause of their performance on an upcoming task. Specifically,
participants indicated if they believed that their performance on the upcoming task would
be due to something about themselves, or, something about the circumstances. The
results indicated that as all participants moved from the contingency task to the .anagram
task, regardless of health status or feedback condition, they believed that their
performance on the second task was due more to something about the circumstances
rather than due to something about themselves. The differential effects predicted for the
asthma participants were not observed.
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Several explanations for the failure to obtain the expected results for the asthma
participants in the non-contingent condition regarding their anagram perfonnance,
emotional reactions to the contingency manipulation, and their attributions are possible.
First, it is possible that a methodological problem contributed to the failure to obtain the
expected results and the failure to replicate the Chaney et a1. (1999) study. Specifically,
participants in the Chaney et a1. (1999) study completed the same contingency
manipulation utilized in this study followed by the same mood measure utilized in this
study, which takes approximately three to five minutes to complete, followed
immediately by the anagram task. In the present study, the same order of tasks was used
except that a measure of self-focus was inserted between the completion of the mood
measure and the anagram task. The self-focus task involved completing thirty sentence
stems in any way that the participant chose. The self-focus measure was inserted at this
point in the procedure in order to obtain a measure of the extent to which the participants
were self-focusing immediately following failure, which was one of the primary
hypotheses of the present study. However, the self-focus sentence completion task took
approximately twenty- to thirty-minutes to complete. Thus, the time delay between the
contingency manipulation and the anagram task may have negated the negative arousal
and possible induced learned helplessness created by the contingency manipulation.
Indeed, previous research has demonstrated that experimentally induced learned
helplessness effects are time-limited, although the parameters ofhow quickly the effect
fades are not well understood (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993). In one of the few
experimental paradigms focusing on the time course of experimentally induced learned
helplessness in humans, Young and Allin (1986) demonstrated that the effects persisted
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across a thirty-minute delay between the non-contingency manipulation and an anagram
test task. The helplessness effects, however, dissipated across both a two- and six-hour
delay such that the performance of participants in the long delay conditions was similar to
individuals who received contingent feedback. The Young and Allin (1986) fmdings
might suggest that the effects in the present study should have persisted across the half-
hour delay; however, it is unclear from Young and Allin's (1986) report of their
methodology if their participants completed an intervening task between the learned
helplessness induction and the anagram test task. fudeed, in the present study, the nature
of the intervening task may have negated the effects of the learned helplessness
induction.
The nature of the self-focus sentence completion task itself may also have served
to ameliorate learned helplessness deficits. Specifically, several of the sentence stems
prompted the participants to think about positive situations, such as when they are
happiest and relationships with friends and family members. Participants also may have
generated statements that brought to mind times when they were successful (e.g., I am at
my best when 1 am playing sports). Dweck, Goetz, and Strauss (1980) note that if a
meaningful change occurs between an uncontrollable event and a subsequent test task
that allows the individual to regain the belief that he is able to affect the outcome of the
second event, learned helplessness effects are unlikely to transfer to a second task.
Gatchel et al. (1975) demonstrated that individuals who experienced non-contingent
feedback had higher levels ofdepression, anxiety, and hostility following the contingency
manipulation when compared to individuals who received contingent feedback.
However, these mood differences were not evident following an anagram test task.
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Gatchel et a1. (1975) suggested that an inteIVening task in which an individual
experiences success may reverse the negative cognitive set caused by the induoed
helplessness. In the present study, the opportunity to write about positive situations and
situations that may have reminded the individual of his personal efficacy may have
functioned as a success experience sufficient enough to negate the induced learned
helplessness effects.
Taken together, the time delay between the contingency manipulation and the test
task, as well as the nature of the task that was utilized, may have allowed the participants
in the non-contingent conditipn to have sufficient time and cognitive distraction to over
come any induced helplessness. Thus, the participants in the non-contingent condition
may not have shown differential performance compared to the participants in the
contingent condition on the anagram task. This change in methodology may account for
why the participants in the non-contingent condition experienced the expected negative
arousal following the contingency manipulation, but failed to demonstrate the expected
cognitive deficits on the anagram task. Further, the time delay and cognitive distraction
may have negated any differential effects of the non-contingent feedback on the asthma
versus healthy control participants.
Another potential explanation regarding the current results is related to the nature
of the sample used in this study. First, the majority of the participants with asthma did
not appear to have a severe disease course. Indeed, the majority of the asthma
participants indicated that they found their asthma to be somewhat to mostly controUable
and appeared to have mild to moderate asthma. Thus, the participants in this sample may
not have had a sufficient number of non-contingent disease-related events to have
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developed a vulnerability to non-contingency. Further, in the current sample the asthma
and healthy control groups evidenced an approximately equal rate ofpsychological
distress as measured by both the Brief SYmptom Inventory and the Inventory to Diagnose
Depression. However, in the Chaney et al. (1999) study, the asthma participants
evidenced higher rates of distress on the IDD than the healthy control participants. Thus,
it appears that the healthy control sample utilized in the present stud}" may have been




The present study also sought to explore differences in self-focus immediately
following the contingency manipulation. The study predicted that asthma participants in
the non-contingent condition would evidence higher levels of self-focus following failure
than healthy control participants in the same condition and all participants in the
contingent condition. Immediately foHowing the contingency manipulation, participants
completed thirty sentence stems. Their responses to the sentence stems were coded for
references to the self, references to a specific, external object, and references that could
not be categorized into either of these groups. The results of the analysis revealed that
there were no differences related to feedback condition or health status regarding the
number of references to the self However, the analysis did reveal that asthma
participants, regardless of feedback condition, made more references to external objects
while healthy control participants, regardless of feedback condition, made more
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references that could not be categorized as a reference to the selfor a specific external
object.
The primary variable of interest from this analysis for the present study was the
number of references to the self. Given that the asthma and healthy control groups did
not differ in the number of references to the self following failure, it does not appear that
individuals with asthma in this sample are more likely to self-focus immediately
following failure than individuals without a chronic illness history. Although the results
did indicate a tendency for asthma participants to be more dispositionaUy self-focused in
regards to private self-consciousness, this tendency did not manifest itself in tenns of
differences in the number of references to the self following failure. As noted earlier, the
majority of asthma participants in the present study did not experience a severe disease
course. Thus, they may not have had a need to frequently self-monitor their internal and
external states, and may not have subsequently developed a tendency to be highly
dispositionally self-focused. Consequently, following failure, the asthma participants
may be expected to respond in a similar fashion to their healthy control peers in regards
to references to the self.
Limitation and Strengths of the Current Study
As noted earlier, several important limitations are acknowledged in the current
study. First, the majority of the individuals with asthma in the current study did not
evidence a severe disease course. Consequently, they many not have had a sufficient
number of non-contingent disease-outcome experiences to have developed a vulnerability
to helplessness. Further, the mild to moderate nature of their illness may not have
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necessitated high levels of self-monitoring fOI disease-related symptoms and potential
attack triggers. Thus, the asthma participants in this sample may not have developed a
habitual self-focus that was being assessed in the present study. Overall, the lack of
disease severity may have significantly interfered with the ability to detect the
relationships under investigation in this study.
Further, as noted earlier, the present study contained a methodological problem
that may have interfered with the ability to obtain the desired results. The time delay
between the contingency manipulation and the test task, as well as the nature of the task
employed during the delay, m,ay have negated the effects of the contingency
manipulation. Thus, the participants in the non-contingent condition may no longer have
been experiencing the effects of the experimental manipulation when they completed the
anagram task, and, therefore, would be expected to perform in a manner similar to the
participants in the contingent condition. Although the placement of the self-focus
sentence task immediately after the contingency manipulation was necessary to answer
one of the research questions posed in the present study, such methodology may have
inadvertently interfered with answering other research questions posed by the study.
Despite these two limitations, several strengths are notable. First, the present
study sought to investigate a population of individuals with asthma that have been largely
ignored to date. Although it was once believed that children outgrew asthma as they
aged, increasing evidence suggests that many children with asthma continue to
experience asthma into adolescence and young adulthood (Price, 1996; Roordan, 1996).
Indeed, this population appears to be largely ignored in tenns ofboth medical care and
psychological treatment of the disorder (Perez-Yarza, 1996). Thus, the present study
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represents a unique effort to document the unique psychological experience of
adolescents and young adults with asthma. Further, the present study is one of a limited
number of studies that attempted to utilize an experimental paradigm within the field of
pediatric psychology. These types of studies are limited, but are an important effort to
uncover the causal mechanisms that may explain how specific disease variables lead to
psychological distress.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Overall, the present study found relatively limited support for its hypotheses. The
results do suggest, however, that individuals with a history of childhood onset asthma
may have a greater tendency to focus more on their internal thoughts and feelings than
individuals without a history of childhood onset asthma. Such findings have important
implications, as individuals with asthma are at risk for making internal attributions for
failure experiences as a result of their constant inward focus. However, the evidence for
this finding in the present study is preliminary and warrants additional research. If future
research replicates these results, practioners who work with individuals with asthma may
need to provide training to help individuals with asthma make appropriate attributions for
failure in order to decrease the risk for psychological distress.
Notably, it appears that methodological changes in the current study offer a partial
explanation for the failure to find the expected results. Thus, future research may attempt
to replicate the Chaney et a1. (1999) study using a more similar methodology. This may
involve a direct replication of the Chaney et a1. (1999) methodology without the
modifications utilized in this study. In addition, future attempts to replicate the Chaney et
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al. (1999) study should include an aggressive attempt to recruit individuals with a more
severe disease course to increase the amount of variability in illness severity. Regardless
of the form the modifications in methodology take, continued research in this area is
important in order to document formally the unique psychological experiences of
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As needed 23 57.5%





Age at first attack 7.64
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Other, please specify: --------------
4. Highest Level of Education Obtained:
1 Middle School
2 High School



















6. Ifmarried, spouse's occupation:
7. Parent's occupation: Father: Mother: _
8. Parent's highest level of education obtained:
Father: Mother: _
9. Do you live with your parents even part-time (including weekends or summers)?
89




11. Have you ever been treated by a physician for a medical condition for more than
three consecutive months in any given year? (For example: May. June. and July, 1999)
YES NO
I 2




13. Do you have a chronic illness?
YES NO
1 2
IF NO, PLEASE ANSWER 13B AND THEN GO ON TO
THE NEXT QUESTIONNAIRE IN YOUR PACKET.
THANK YOU. IF YES, PLEASE GO ON TO
QUESTION 14.
-+ 13B. Please estimate the number of school and/or work days
you missed during the last academic (2000-2001)for medical
reasons. (If you are a freshman in college and you were in
high school during the 2000-2001 academic year. please refer
to your senior year of high school. If you were not in school




14. Do you have asthma?
YES NO
1 2









If yes, was your counseling related to your asthma?
YES NO
1 2
16. Are you currently taking any medications for your asthma?
YES NO
1 2






17. At what age did you have your first asthma attack?
18. At what age were you diagnosed with asthma?




If yes, please indicate the number of visits to your physician in the past 6 months.
















Mild = 1 or 2 attacks per week; as many as two episodes ofnighttime cough a month;
good exercise tolerance; no symptoms between attacks; bronchospasm responds to
bronchodilator
Moderate =More than 2 attacks per week; symptoms between attacks; symptoms affect
sleep, activity level, or work performance; bronchospasm responds to bronchodilator;
reduced exercise tolerance; coughing; chest tightness, wheezing; seeking emergency
room treatment more than three times per year.
Severe = Daily wheezing; sudden, severe attacks; limited exercise tolerance and activity
level; sleep is disrupted; bronchospasm does not always respond to bronchodilator; poor
work attendance; mild tachycardia (excessively rapid heartbeat); tachypnea (excessively
rapid breathing); difficulty speaking in complete sentences; seeking emergency care more
than 3 times per year.
Respiratory Failure = Increased tachycardia (excessively rapid heartbeat); tachypnea
(excessively rapid breathing); wheezing; reduced, poor air exchange; uses accessory
muscles (e.g., arms) to sit up, with perspiration; confusion; lethargy; altered
conSCIOusness













23. Please estimate the number of school and/or work days you missed during the last
academic year (e.g., 2000-2001) as a result ofyour asthma or asthma-related symptoms.
(If you are a freshman in college and you were in high school during the 2000-2001
academic year, please refer to your senior year of high school. If you were not in school
during the 2000-2001 academic year, please list days from work only.)
SCHOOL: _
WORK: --------
24. Please estimate the number of school and/or work days you missed during the last
academic (2000-2001)for medical reasons other than asthma. (I~you are a freshman in
college and you were in high school during the 2000-2001 academiC year, please refer to
your senior year of high school. If you were not in school during the 2000-2001
academic year, please list days from work only.)
SCHOOL: _
WORK:




If yes, please estimate the number ofdays you did attend class when you had asthma
symptoms?
If yes, please the number that indicates how much the asthma symptoms interfered with

















If yes, please estimate the number of days you did attend work when you had asthma
symptoms?
If yes, please circle the number that indicates how much the astruna symptoms interfered











27. During the 2000-2001 academic year, do you feel that your asthma interfered with
your social life? .
YES NO
1 2
If yes, please circle the number that indicates how much your asthma symptoms



















1. On this questionnaire are groups of 5 statements.
2. Read each group of statements carefully. Then pick the one statement in each group
that best describes the way you have been feeling the PAST TWO WEEKS. Circle the































I do not feel sad or depressed.
I occasionally feel sad or down.
I feel sad most of time, but I can snap out of it.
I feel sad all the time, and I cannot snap out of it.
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
My energy level is normal.
My energy level is occasionally a little lower than normal.
I get tired more easily or have less energy than usual.
I get tired from doing almost anything.
I feel tired or exhausted almost all of the time.
I have not been feeling more restless and fidgety than usual.
I feel a little more restless or fidgety than usual.
I have been very fidgety, and I have some difficulty sitting still in a chair.
I have been extremely fidgety, and I have been pacing a little bit almost
every day.
I have been pacing more than an hour per day, and 1 cannot sit still.
I have not been talking or moving more slowly than usual.
I am talking a little slower than usual.
I am speaking slower than usual, and it takes me longer to respond to
questions, but I can still carryon a normal conversation.
Normal conversations are difficult because it is difficult for me to start
talking.
I feel extremely slowed down physically, like I am stuck in mud.
I have not lost interest in my usual activities.
I am a little less interested in 1 or 2 of my usual activities.
I am less interested in several of my usual activities.
I have lost most ofmy interest in almost all of my activities.
I have lost interest in all of my usual activities.
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6. 0 I get as much pleasure out of my usual activities as usual
I i get a little less pleasure from 1 or 2 of my usual activities.
2 I get less pleasure from several of my usual activities.
3 I get almost no pleasure from most of the activities that I usually enjoy.
4 I get no pleasure from any of the activities, which I usually enjoy.
7. 0 I have not been feeling guilty.
I I occasionally feel a little guilty.
2 I often feel guilty.
3 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
4 I feel extremely guilty most of the time.
8. 0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 My opinion ofmyself is occasionally a little low.
2 I feel I am inf~rior to most people.
3 I feel like a failure.
4 I feel I am totally a worthless person.
9. 0 I haven't had any thought of death or suicide.
1 I occasionally think life is not worth living.
2 I frequently think of dying in passive ways (such as going to sleep and not
waking up), or that I'd be better off dead.
3 I have frequent thoughts or killing myself, but I would not carry them out.
4 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. 0 I can concentrate as well as usual.
1 My ability to concentrate is slightly worse than usual.
2 My attention span is not as good as usual and I am having difficulty
collecting my thoughts, but this hasn't caused any problems.
3 My ability to read or hold a conversation is not as good as it usually is.
4 I cannot read, watch TV, or have a conversation without great difficulty.
11. 0 I make decisions as well as I usually do.
I Decision-making is slightly more difficult than usual.
2 It is harder and takes longer to make decisions, but I do make them.
3 I am unable to make some decisions.
4 I can't make any decisions at all.
12. 0 My appetite is not less than normal.
1 My appetite is slightly worse than usual.
2 My appetite is clearly not as good as usual, but I still eat.
3 My appetite is much worse now.
4 I have no appetite at all, and I have to force myself to eat even a little.
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13. 0 I haven't lost any weight.
1 I've lost less than 5 pounds.
2 I've lost between 5-10 pounds.
3 I've lost between 11-25 pounds.
4 I've lost more than 25 pounds.
14. 0 My appetite is not greater than usual.
1 My appetite is slightly greater than normal.
2 My appetite is clearly greater than normal.
3 My appetite is much greater than usual.
4 I feel hungry all the time.
15. 0 I haven't gained any weight.
1 I've gained less than 5 pounds.
2 I've gained between 5-10 pounds.
3 I've gained between 11-25 pounds.
4 I've gained more than 25 pounds.
16. 0 I am not sleeping less than normal.
1 I occasionally have slight difficulty sleeping.
2 I clearly don't sleep as well as usual.
3 I sleep about halfmy normal amount of time.
4 I sleep less than 2 hours per night.
17. 0 I am not sleeping more than normal.
1 I occasionally sleep more than normal.
2 I frequently sleep at least 1 hour more than usual.
3 I frequently sleep at least 2 hours more than usual.
4 I frequently sleep at least 3 hours more than usual.
, :
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1 @ 0 0 @ 0 Nervousness or shakiness inside
2 @ 0 0 @ 0 Faintness or dizziness
3 @ 0 0 @ 0 The idea thai someone else can control your thoughts
4 @ 0 ® @ 0 Feeling others are to blame for most of your troubles
5 @ 0 0 @ 0 Trouble remembering things
6 @ 0 0 @ 0 Feeling easily annoyed or irritated
7 @ 0 0 @ 0 Pains in heart or chest
8 @ 0) 0 @ 0 Feeling afraid in open spaces or on the streets
9 @ 0) 0 0) 0 Thoughts of ending your life
10 @ 0 0 0) 0 Feeling that mosl people cannot be trusted
11 @ 0 0 @ 0 Poor appetite
12 ® 0 ® 0) 0 Suddenly scared tor no reason
13 ® 0 CD 0) @ Temper outbursts that you could not control
14 ® (2) CD CD 0 Feeling lonely even when you are with people
15 ® 0 CD @ @ Feeling blocked in getting things done
16 ® (2) CD CD @ Feeling lonely
17 ® 0 CD @ 0 Feeling blue
18 ® 0) ® @ 0 Feeling no interest in things
19 ® 0 ® @ @ Feeling tearful
20 ® 0 CD CD 0 Your feelings being easily hurt
21 ® CD CD @ @ Feeling that people are unfriendly or dislike you
22 ® CD CD 0 0 Feeling inferior to others
23 ® CD 0 0 0 Nausea or upset stomach
24 ® CD CD CD 0 Feeling that you are watched or talked about by others
2S ® CD 0 0 0 Trouble falling asleep
26 ® CD 0 CD 0 Having to check and double-check what you do
27 ® CD 0 CD 0 Difficully making decisions
28 ® 0 0 CD 0 Feeling afraid to travel on buses, subways, or trains
29 ® CD 0 CD (9 Trouble getting your breath
30 ® 0) CD CD (9 Hot or cold spells
31 ® CD CD CD 0 Having to avoid certain things, places, or activities because they frighten you
32 ® 0) 0 CD 0 Your mind going blank .
33 ® 0 0 0 0 Numbness or tingling in parts of your body
34 ® 0 0 0 0 The idea that you should be punished for your sins
3S ® 0 0 0 (9 Feeling hopeless aboul the future
36 @ CD 0 0 0 Trouble concentrating
37 ® CD CD CD 0 Feeling weak in parts of your body
38 ® (2) CD 0 0 Feeling tense or keyed up
39 ® 0 0 0 0 Thoughts of death or dying
40 ® 0 ® 0 0 Having urges to beat, injure, or harm someone
41 ® 0 CD 0 0 Having urges to break or smash things
42 ® 0 0 CD 0 Feeling very self<onscious with others
43 ® 0) CD CD 0 Feeling uneasy in crowds, such as shopping or at a movie
44 ® (2) CD CD 0 Never feeling close to another person
45 ® 0) CD CD 0 Spells of terror or panic
46 ® CD CD CD 0 Getting into frequent arguments
47 ® CD CD CD 0 Feeling nervous when you are left alone
48 ® 0) 0 0 (9 Others not giving you proper credit for your achievements
49 ® CD 0 0 (9 Feeling so restless you couldn't sit still
50 ® CD CD 0 0 Feelings of worthlessness
S1 ® 0 0 0 0 Feeling that people will take advantage of you if you let them
52 ® CD 0 0 0 Feelings of guill .







INSTRUCTIONS: Please check the words that you feel apply to you right now, at this
moment.
1 active 45 fit 89 peaceful
2 adventurous 46 forlorn 90 pleased
3 affectionate 47 frank 91 ,pleasant
4 afraid 48 free 92 Ipolite
5 agitated 49 friendly 93 Ipowerful
6 agreeable 50 frightened 94 Iquiet
7 aggressive 51 furious 95 reckless
8 alive 52 gay 96 rejected
9 alone 53 'gentle 97 rough
10 amiable 54 glad 98 sad
11 amused 55 gloomy 99 safe
12 angry 56 Igood 100 satisfied
13 annoyed 57 igood-natured 101 secure
14 awful 58 Igrim 102 shaky
15 bashful 59 happy 103 shy
16 bitter 60 healthy 104 soothed
17 blue 61 hopeless 105 steady
18 bored 62 hostile 106 stubborn
19 calm 63 impatient 107 stonny
20 cautious 64 incensed 108 strong
21 cheerful 65 indignant 109 suffering
22 clean 66 inspired 110 sullen
23 complaining 67 interested III sunk
24 contented 68 irritated 112 sympathetic
25 contrary 69 Ijealous 113 tame
26 cool 70 Iioyful 114 tender
27 cooperative 71 kindly 115 tense
28 critical 72 lonely 116 terrible
29 cross 73 lost 117 terrified
30 cruel 74 10ying 118 thoughtful
31 daring 75 low 119 timid
32 desperate 76 lucky 120 tonnented
33 destroyed 77 mad 121 understanding
34 devoted 78 mean 122 unhappy
35 disagreeable 79 meek 123 unsociable
36 discontented 80 merry 124 upset
37 discouraged 81 mild 125 vexed
38 disgusted 82 miserable 126 warm
39 displeased 83 nervous 127 whole
40 energetic 84 obliging 128 wild
41 enraged 85 offended 129 willful
42 enthusiastic 86 outraged 130 wilted
43 fearful 87 panicky 131 worrying






Items on the private self-consciousness scale
I'm always trying to figure myself out. (1)
Generally, I'm not very aware ofmyself. (3)*
I reflect about myself a lot. (5)
I'm often the subject ofmy own fantasies. (7)
I never scrutinize myself. (9)*
I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings. (13)
I'm constantly examining my motives. (15)
I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself. (18)
I'm alert to changes in my mood. (20)
I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem. (22)
Items on the public self-consciousness scale
I'm concerned about my style of doing things. (2)
I'm concerned about the way I present myself. (6)
I'm self-conscious about the way I look. (11)
I usually worry about making a good impression. (14)
One of the last things I do before I leave the house is look in the mirror. (17)
I'm concerned about what other people think of me. (19)
I'm usually aware of my appearance. (21)
Items on the social anxiety scale
It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations. (4)
I have trouble working when someone is watching me. (8)
I get embarrassed very easily. (10)
I don't find it hard to talk to strangers. (12)*
I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group. (16)
Large groups make me nervous. (23)
The number in parentheses represents the order of the items on the original scale. Items




VISUAL ANALOG SCALE AND INTERNAL-EXTERNAL





1. The scale below asks you to rate the extent to which you expect to succeed on the
computer task that will be administered. The scale ranges from "Much worse than most
people" to "Much better than most people." Please place an "X" on the line that indicates





(For question 2, please circle one number for your answer. Please do not circle tbe
words.)
2. Do you think that your performance on the upcoming task will be due to something
about you or something about other circumstances?
Totally due to other
Circumstances
Totally due to me
2 3 4 5 6 7
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1. The scale below asks you to rate the extent to which you expect to succeed on the next
task that will be administered. The scale ranges from «Much worse than most people" to
"Much better than most people." Please place an "X" on the line that indicates how you





(For question 2, please circle one number for your answer. Please do not circle the
words.)
2. Do you think that your performance on the upcoming task will be due to something
about you or something about other circumstances?
Totally due to other
Circumstances
Totally due to me







Instructions: Please complete each sentence stem with the first idea that comes to mind.
1. I think: _
2. I am happiest when: _
3. It's fun to daydream about: _
4. My father: _
5. If only I could: _
6. It's hardest for me: _
7. I wish: _
8. As a child 1: _
9. I am: _
10. I am at my best _
11. Others: _
12. When I look in the mirror: _
13. If only I would: _
14. At least I'm not _
110
SFSC pg.2. Subject # _
15. My sex life: _
16. It upsets me when: _
17. The thing I like best about myself: _
18. Friends: _
19. I would like most to be photographed:, _
20. I guess I'm:, _
21. My mother: _
22. I wonder:, _
23. The worst thing about me:, _
24. I always wanted:, _
25. I try hardest to please: _
26. Someday 1: _
27. Myappearance: _
28. My parents: _
29. If! had myway: _
III
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30. I like: _
APPENDIXJ
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Subject's height in inches: _
Practice Trial PEFR rating: _
Trial One PEFR rating: _
Trial Two PEFR rating: _









We are interested in gathering additional infonnation about you in order to answer
more of our research questions. You have the choice ofwhether or not to provide this
additional infonnation. Participation in this part of the experiment is voluntary and
refusal to participate will not affect your course credit or compensation for
completing the previous two phases of the experiment. Please consider each of the
requests listed below.
Part One: Request to obtain GPA
We would like to obtain your grade point average (GPA) to use in our analyses.
We would like to obtain your GPA for the most recent semester you completed as
well as your cumulative GPA. IF this is your first semester in college, we will
request your GPA from your last semester of high school as well as your cumulative
high school GPA. In order to ensure accuracy, we would like to obtain this
infonnation from the registrar at Oklahoma State University. Please note that we will
not use your individual GPA when reporting the results of the study. We will only
report average GPA's for groups of participants in the study.
I consent to allow Jill Van Pelt, Misty Boyd, or their authorized---
representatives to obtain my GPA for the most recent semester I completed in college
and my cumulative college GPA. If this is my first semester in college, I understand
they will request my GPA from my last semester of high school and my cumulative
high school GPA.
I DO NOT give pennission for my GPA to be obtained from the Oklahoma---
State University Registrar.









Part Two: Permission to contact parent (Asthma participants only)
In order to ensure the highest level of accuracy for the data, we would like to
contact one of your parents who can confinn the age at which you were diagnosed
with asthma. We will only contact your parent to ask about confirming the age at
which you were diagnosed with asthma
____ I consent to allow Jill VanPelt, Misty Boyd, or their authorized
representative to contact my parent, whose name is listed below, to confirm the age at
which I was diagnosed with asthma.









Phone number of parent to
contact: _
Mailing address of parent to
contact:---------------------
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Part Three: Permission to contact physician for severity rating. (Asthma
participants only)
We would like to ask you current physician to provide a rating of the severity of
your asthma. This procedure would involve us a mailing a copy of this consent fonn
to your physician along with a brief questionnaire assessing the severity of your
asthma. You doctor will provide no additional information about your medical
history other than the information assessed on the severity rating form.
____ I consent to allow Jill VanPelt, Misty Boyd, or the authorized
representatives to contact my physician (listed below) to obtain a rating of the
severity of my asthma.
_____ I DO NOT consent to allow my physician to be contact to obtain a










Name of practice or hospital physician is affiliated with:




Part Four: Permission for follow-up contact
We would like to speak with you again, once or twice within the next year. This
follow-up would most likely involve asking you questions about the nature ofyour
asthma during the time period between completing this study and the time of follow-
up. We would most likely as you questions regarding how much school or work you
had to miss due to your asthma (if any), how much your asthma has impacted your
social life (if at all), and how severe your asthma has been during the intervening
period. You would have the right to refuse to participate in follow-ups at the time of
the follow-up contact even if you sign the consent form today.
____ I consent for Jill Van Pelt, Misty Boyd, or an authorized representative to
contact me for no more than two follow-up sessions within a year of the date on this
form to ask me follow-up questions related to my asthma.





















I, , (name of participant), voluntarily consent to
participate in the investigation of cognitive abilities, the purposes of which have been
explained to me by Jill Van Pelt, or Misty Boyd, or associates or assistants of their
choosing. 1 thereby authorize Jill Van Pelt, or Misty Boyd, or associates or assistants
to perform the following treatments or procedures:
I understand that the research requires the completion of several paper-and-pencil
measures that address my perceptions of life events. In addition, I will be asked to
complete computer tasks.
I understand that any data collected as part of my participation in this experiment will
be treated as confidential and will receive a code number so that they will remain
anonymous. In no case, will any use be made of these data other than as research
results. If data from my participation are ever displayed, my identity will remain
anonymous.
I understand that I will receive either two (2) research credits or the sum of$10 for
two hours of participation. I understand that, although my participation may not be
personally beneficial to me, the information derived from this project may have
important implications for others. I realize that the information gained may
contribute to better understanding of the cognitive abilities in individuals with and
without astluna.
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that there is no penalty for refusal to
participate, and that I am free to withdraw my consent and participation in this project
at any time without penalty, after notifying the project director.
I may contact Dr. Larry Mullins, Psychology Department, 215 North Murray Hall,
Oklahoma State University, at (405)-744-6951 should I wish further infonnation
about the research. I may also contact Sharon Bacher, IRB Executive Secretary, 203
Whitehurst, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 74078, (405)-744-
6501. Should any problems arise during the course of the study, I may take them to
Dr. Maureen Sullivan, Psychology Department Head, 215 North Murray Hall,
Oklahoma State University, at (405)-744-6027.
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I have read and fully understand the consent fonn. I sign it freely and voluntarily. A





I certify that I have personally explained all elements of this fonn to the participant
before requesting that he or she sign it.
Signature of Project Director (or authorized representative) Date and Time
NOTE: There are circumstances under which (a) some or all of the elements in the
above fonn may be altered or waived and/or (b) the requirement for the consent fonn
to be signed may be waived. See 45 CFR, Sections 46.116 and 46.117, or contact the






The preceding experiment examined the relationship between self-focused
attention and health status. During the computer task, some participants did not have
control over solving the problems. Participants were manipulated to believe that they
were capable of solving what was actually an unsolvable task. Any frustration or
negative perceptions you may have experienced in response to the task were purely a
function of the deceptive nature of the experiment. Your performance is not a
reflection of you ability to perform this, or related, tasks.
Some of the questionnaires, in addition to the computer task, may have touched
upon sensitive issues such as depression. The scores that you received on any of the
questionnaires are not available to me. Thus, I do not know how you performed on
any of these measures. Since these tasks might have elicited some introspection on
your part, we are handing out a list of the services available in the area to everyone, in
case they are interested in speaking with someone.
Finally, we ask that you do not tell anyone about any portion of this experiment.
Do you have any questions?
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Experimenter: Please record the participant's explanation ofhow he or she went






Psychological Services Center - (118 North Murray Hall, 744-5975)
The center provides assistance to any interested individual from Oklahoma State
University or the surrounding area. The center is open Monday, Tuesday, and
Thursday from 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. and Wednesday and Friday from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
There is a graduate fee for those using this service. All appointments are confidential.
Personal Counseling Services - 310 Student Union, 744-5472 or 002 Student Health
Center, 744-7007
The Personal Counseling Services supports the personal, social, and intellectual
growth of members of the University community. They provide a broad spectrum of
services to OSU students.
Counseling services include individual and group counseling relating to areas of
career/life planning, study skills, and personal concerns including stress, anxiety,
depression, relationships, eating disorders, and substance abuse. Counseling sessions
are provided at a minimal fee. All appointments are confidential.
Reach-out Hotline - Oklahoma City, 1-800-522-9054






Means and Standard Deviations Comparing Participants on Psychological Distress Measures
p (2-
Variable Illness Group N Mean SD tailed)
Iventory to Diagnose
Depression 1.48 0.14
Asthma 40 9.35 6.85
Healthy
Control 39 7.25 5.63
BSI Global Severity Index 1.78 0.08
Asthma 40 53.58 11.48
Healthy
Control 40 49.20 10.47
BSI Depression T-score 0.31 0.76
Asthma 40 51.23 10.12
Healthy
Control 40 50.58 8.80
BSI Obsessive-
Complusiveness 1.09 0.28
T-Score Asthma 40 55.65 13.49
Healthy
Control 40 52.80 9.66
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity 0.46 0.64
T-Score Asthma 40 53.58 11.87
Healthy
Control 40 52.38 11.18
BSI Anxiety T-Score 1.00 0.32
Asthma 40 49.73 10.52
Healthy
Control 40 47.60 8.28
BSI Hostility T-Score 1.42 0.16
Asthma 40 53.95 11.20
Healthy
Control 40 50.73 8.93
BSI Phobic Anxiety T-Score 0.52 0.60
Asthma 40 49.78 9.72
Healthy
Control 40 48.70 8.67
BSI Psychoticism T-Score 0.69 0.49
Asthma 40 54.63 11.13
Healthy
Control 40 53.00 9.97
BSI Paranoid Ideation T-Score 0.80 0.43
Asthma 40 51.88 13.13
Healthy
Control 40 49.83 9.56
BSI Somatization T-Score 3.30
<.01
Asthma 40 55.65 12.35
Healthy





































































Means and Standard Deviationsfor Number ofAnagrams Solved
Incorrectly
Standard
Feedback Condition Mean Deviation
Contingent
Asthma 3.45 2.93
Healthy Contol 3.65 3.28
Non-contingent
Asthma 3.55 3.65




Means and Standard Deviationsfor MAACL Subscale Scores
Time 1 Time 2
Feedback
Variable Condition Mean SD Mean SD
Depression
Contingent
Asthma 11.80 5.35 10.70 5.71
Healthy
Control 12.95 4.45 12.55 4.62
Non-contingent
Asthma 11.85 5.65 14.20 6.31
Healthy
Control 12.45 5.53 14.75 5.25
Anxiety
Contingent
Asthma 6.25 3.99 5.30 3.76
Healthy
Control 6.50 2.91 6.05 2.80
Non-contingent
Asthma 5.90 3.35 7.05 3.65
Healthy
Control 6.35 2.83 7.80 2.44
Hostility
Contingent
Asthma 7.70 3.84 7.55 3.53
Healthy
Control 7.60 2.81 8.00 2.27
Non-contingent
Asthma 6.95 3.33 9.30 3.16
Healthy
Control 7.25 2.90 9.20 3.38
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for VAS and Internal Attributions Scores
Time I Time 2
Feedback





















Means and Standard Deviations for References to Self. External Objects. and Other
Responses
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